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Abstract 
 
Many Operational Research (OR) problems like scheduling and timetabling, are 
associated with evaluating the distribution of resources in a set of entities. This set 
of entities can be defined as a society having some common traits. The evaluation 
of the distribution is traditionally done with a utilitarian approach, or using some 
statistical methods. In order to gain a more in depth view of distributions in 
problem solving new measures and models from the fields of Computer Science, 
Economics, and Sociology, as well OR are proposed. These models focus on 3 
concepts: fairness (minimisation of inequalities), social welfare (combination of 
fairness and efficiency) and poverty (starvation of resources). A Multiple Criteria 
Decision Making (MCDM) model, combining utilitarian, fairness and poverty 
measures is also proposed. These measures and models are applied to the nurse 
rostering problem from a central decision maker point of view. Nurses are treated 
as a society, trying to optimise nurse satisfaction. Nurse satisfaction is investigated 
independently from the hospital management, forming two conflicting criteria. The 
results from different measures cannot be evaluated using cardinal measures, so 
MCDM methods and Lorenz Curves are used instead of a numerical, cardinal 
measure. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Many operational research (OR) problems are in fact judging the distribution of certain 
resources. Problems like nurse rostering (eg), air flow control (Bertsimas and Patterson 
1998), network flow (eg Bonald and Massoulié 2001, Mazumdar 1991) are in fact evaluating 
societies in a perspective of either total utility or the fairness of equal distribution. Thus, a 
social system that can be described as mathematical problem can be subject to fairness, 
depending on decision makers preferences. Since there is not much research done in 
evaluating societies in the field of OR, the measures of evaluating societies ought to be taken 
from other sciences, namely social sciences and economics. 
Two different philosophy schools of judging a potential distribution exist: the utilitarian one 
(Mill 1863, Jeremy Bentham 1789 amongst others) judging an allocation by the total amount 
of “pleasure” that is distributed in society members, and egalitarian (Lorenz 1905, Arrow 
1983, Sen 1973 amongst others) that focuses on the minimising inequalities. Note that most 
of the egalitarian measures do target absolute fairness, but since it is rarely possible to 
achieve strong egalitarianism they focus on minimising inequalities. 
Societies can be evaluated on frequency distributions of an attribute, which will be referred 
as utility. Utility can be either negative (for example penalty, constrain violations, time units 
on hold), or). Every one of those measures can be transformed to utility using a utility 
function. 
In the first section, a number of social choice measures with emphasis on egalitarian ones is 
going to be listed. The properties that the measures described above must have and calculate 
the possible computation cost of each one are going to be underlined. A number of widely 
used measures might be discarded for not fulfilling the necessary properties. A number of 
them might be discarded due to the lack of computational cost feasibility. 
However, judging a society with aspect to only of one of those approaches is, most of the 
times, incomplete. Even though certain methods can take both utilitarian and egalitarian 
perspective into consideration (for example, Generalised Lorenz Curve), most of existing 
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measures focus on either one. Thus, goal programming methods can be used to aggregate 
those two different approaches. 
Merging different approaches from different disciplines has always been a part of OR. In this 
thesis the aim will be to merge OR with the fields of Social Sciences, and Economics, moving 
forward in a direction that will help us have a complete view on problem solving. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the use of fairness concepts in an OR problem. 
While fairness concepts have been used in OR in the past (e.g. Vasupongayya and Chiang 
1995, Muhlenthaler and Wanka 2012) the models used were in essence inequality aversion. 
In view of this, a distinction between fairness, equity and equality must be made. 
Fairness has also be used in MCDM environment. In Romero 2001, 2004 the   meta‐
objective, minimising the maximum unwanted deviation in Extended Lexicographic Goal 
Programming formulation, is a MinMax/Rawls principle that has been a key principle in 
economics. This opens the question if further inequality averse models can be used in 
MCDM.  
Given those issues, the main objectives of this Thesis are: 
 A framework that incorporates concepts of inequality from literature into OR 
fairness. 
 Experimental use of inequality models into a OR problem. 
 Explore different approaches in social sciences literature that can be used in OR (e.g. 
poverty). 
 Explore opportunities using Fairness concepts in MCDM. 
 Identify ways of evaluating results with regard of fairness. 
 
1.3 Contribution 
The main contributions of this thesis are: 
 A unified framework for defining fairness. Models are examined on the basis of 
certain properties, computability being one of them. 
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 A series of models that are taken from diverse fields of work. Models from economics 
(Gini Index), computing (Jain index) and social sciences are incorporated in the 
context of an OR problem. 
 In order to evaluate and compare the different results produced by the proposed 
models a framework for evaluating results with the notion of fairness including 
graphical representation was used. 
 Representing nurses as criteria, ELECTRE method was used to compare models 
results as well. The weights used in ELECTRE were produced from a formula in order 
to demonstrate a sense of fairness. 
 Introducing models with the concept of “resource starvation” or poverty as objective 
functions. Those models require the existence of a threshold, poverty line, based on 
which a member can be “impoverished” or needing more resources 
 Measures that incorporate both fairness and equality properties 
 Tests that demonstrate the dominance of some models over the others, using the 
nurse rostering problem. The results were evaluated using the constructed 
frameworks 
 A Goal Programming model using meta goals was introduced. The meta‐goals of 
Fairness, Efficiency and Poverty were implemented. This showed that a formulation 
combining goals could work. 
1.4 Nurse rostering 
Healthcare workforce scheduling has been a topic of discussion in academic and non‐
academic circles the past decades. With the reduction in the number of medical jobs 
available in the NHS, new issues might arise. Happiness in workspace is also important to 
productivity (Harter et al 2002). Scheduling and fairness has been pointed to be an important 
factor (Mueller & McCloskey 1990, Kovner et al 2006, Hayes et al 2010) to nurses’ 
satisfaction.  
The Nurse Rostering Problem (NRP) is a complex combinatorial optimisation problem that 
has been thoroughly studied in the literature. In its general form, NRP is defined as assigning 
nurses over given shifts over a period of time, subject to a set of constraints. Because of its 
complexity, NRP is usually approached using heuristic and metaheuristic methods (Burke et 
al 2008, Martin et al 2013) 
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Approaches to NRP vary, from modelling the problem (Warner and Prawda 1972, Vanhoucke 
and Maenhout 2007, Bilgin 2008, Burke et al 2008) developing methods and procedures (For 
example, Berrada et al 1996, Burke et al 1999, 2001, Constantino et al 2011, Bilgin et al 2012, 
Martin et al 2013 ), or incorporating fairness features into the problem (Martin et al  2013, 
Ouelhadj et al 2013, Wang et al 2014). 
The amount of literature (Ernst et al 2004, Burke et al 2004) and the vast attention NRP has 
received shows the complexity of the problem and the different approaches within the 
scientific community, as well as the real world application. The complexity of the problem 
allows for different elements to be considered for every nurse. This may create a lot of 
diversity in the happiness for each nurse, that in turn allows for diversity in the results 
produced by the fairness measures. That is particularly important because there are 
measures ranging from 0 to 1, and a small change could be critical. Since NRP may involve 
actual humans, examining this problem under the prism of fairness can be a logical 
development. 
In NRP it is common to be modelled as constraint violation problem. There are several types 
of constraint violations, we can group them in 2 different categories: Hospital needs, and 
nurses’ needs/preferences. The fairness concept on this work focuses on nurses: instead of 
adding all constraint violations for the group of nurses, constraint violations for each nurse 
is calculated. This way each nurse has a negative “utility” upon which fairness concepts can 
be implemented. 
Further information for the benchmarks and the NRP model used will be presented in 
Chapter 4. 
 
 
1.5 Outline of thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Definitions and concepts of fairness are presented in chapter 2. A review on the literature on 
philosopher work about equity, fairness and equality is provided. Connections with applied 
sciences like economics or social sciences are made. 
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In chapter 3 the models are presented and examined. Fairness, efficiency, poverty and Social 
welfare function (SWF) models are explained and examined based on their properties. An 
algorithmic analysis is also provided. Fairness in operation research problems is also 
investigated. 
In chapter 4 some tools that are used throughout the thesis are presented. Nurse rostering 
problem is introduced, as well as the benchmarks used. Lorenz curves and ELECTRE are 
presented. Goal programming is also described. 
In chapter 5 poverty concepts are introduced. A framework is established for poverty 
measurement and identification. Poverty measures are evaluated based on the 
aforementioned framework. 
In chapter 6 the adaptation from fairness measures for maximisation problems to 
minimisation are made. Results on fairness measures are presented. Evaluation is performed 
using ELECTRE and Lorenz curves. 
Chapter 7 presents results for poverty measures. An analysis on different poverty line is being 
made. Results are presented and visualised with a number of different techniques. 
In chapter 8 a combination of fairness and efficiency measures are introduced, as social 
welfare functions, with a goal to optimise in both the quality of roster and minimisation of 
inequalities. Again, nurses and hospital needs are examined. 
In chapter 9 Goal programming model is introduced (Jones and Tamiz 2010). The parameters 
that are used affect both the nurse roster (efficiency, fairness, minimisation of unhappiness) 
and ward coverage. Results show the use of having multiple objectives rather than just one. 
The final chapter reviews the achievements of this thesis, presents general conclusions and 
propose directions for future research on fairness models methods and applications. 
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Chapter 2 Fairness introduction 
2.1 Introduction on fairness 
The topics of fairness and equality are concepts that engage a diverse set of disciplines. 
Philosophers, politicians, religions, economists, social scientists, and recently scientists that 
are connected with Operational Research (OR) (e.g. computer scientists) have been occupied 
with it. In this chapter the general concept of fairness, equality and equity are introduced. 
Differences between fairness, equality and equity are presented and point out the diverse 
set of disciplines that fairness is connected. 
2.1.1 Fairness 
Oxford dictionary defines fairness as “Impartial and just treatment or behaviour without 
favouritism or discrimination.”  
The concept of fairness is met since the earliest philosophy literature, beginning in Ancient 
Greece. In ancient Greek the word «δίκαιο» meant both fair (in the ethical way) and just (in 
a lawful way), and the concept of it was encountered in a wide range of things, from the 
government of communities to transactions. 
Plato: “the republic” –πολιτεία‐ it is underlined by Polemarchus that ascribing equals is fair. 
A cynical view that was described was that the stronger or richer people should be treated 
fairly, or better than others, since they can afford it. Plato describes how a community would 
prosper, by introducing a concept of decision makers, the philosopher‐kings. The state 
should be run by those experts that their goal is the good of the whole community and 
balancing the needs of the several members of society with the good of the community in 
mind. In this description the state is fair in scope of a community, even though some 
individuals may not be as privileged.  
Marx (1875) outlined two different cases of fairness: need based fairness and work based 
fairness. In the stage described as socialism, everyone is rewarded depending on his 
contribution to society. In the stage described as communism, people are being treated 
based on their needs. This is because in communism resources are abundant there are no 
restrains on the amount of resources distributed.  
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2.1.2 Equity 
 
Equity concept is common in philosophical discussions. Oxford dictionary defines equity as 
“The quality of being fair and impartial”. 
Hobbes (1588‐1679) presented a definition of the equity concept. He stated that equity is a 
human quality that characterizes everyone or some individuals as well as it is a law of nature 
that humans are obliged to follow.  
According to Kant, one can’t demand being treated favorably. However, if someone claims 
something on the basis of equity, he is obliged to treat others like that. Kant gives a number 
of examples of equity, in different contexts, that recite on the concept of equal pay for equal 
work. For instance, in a company where the shareholders have different participation in 
capital, the profits or losses that incur on individuals should be proportionate to their 
participation. 
Early Philosophers like Bentham (1789) discussed about the utilitarian approach. Bentham 
advocated that the measure a societies total happiness is the sum of the happiness of 
individuals. Any increase on total happiness would lead to a better society. This approach 
has been criticized since it takes in no consideration the distribution among individuals. 
2.1.3 Equality 
Oxford dictionary defines equality as “The state of being equal, especially in status, rights, or 
opportunities.” 
According to Dalton (1920) states that equality depends on the context that the definition is 
applied. An example is presented in an economic context, where the situation of perfect 
equality is reached when the total income is distributed in equal parts among a number of 
persons.  
As it is presented above, the concept of equality is often treated in regard to the equity 
concept. In the following paragraph this aspect is focused pointing out the differences 
between equality and equity. 
According to Bronfenbrenner (1973) equity is a subjective concept whereas equality is 
objective. He describes the differences between equality and equity and concludes that even 
though there are phonetic similarities and philological connections, the two terms are quite 
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distinct. He mentions that the equity is non –mechanical in principle and is in essence a 
subjective matter. In order to achieve equity, the wealth distribution has to be done in line 
with principles of justice. 
Equality is largely a mechanical matter and in fact is associated with a measure that can be 
equal, such as wealth per unit or income. In addition, Espinoza (2007) states that while 
equality involves a quantitative assessment, equity has an ethical judgment and a 
quantitative assessment as well.  
Equality can also be described as a state that no individual wants to take the place of another. 
This is also the concept of Envy‐freeness, where comparisons between individual utility is 
not relevant, and an allocation is considered envy free if no one prefers the state of another 
individual.  
Rousseau (1954) claimed that inequality is inherent to societies, and related to the concept 
of property. However, men were created as good, and with no ill will but society corrupted 
them. 
It is commonly presumed that fairness, equity and equality are identical. However, even 
when a system is fair it can create inequalities, depending on constrains and individual utility 
functions. Measurement of inequality is usually done by a series of statistical dispersion 
measures. 
2.2 Fairness in economics and social sciences 
Sen (1982) introduce the questions of “equality of what”. Sen attempts to give an answer to 
this question by stating that we have to be preoccupied with the distribution of capabilities 
in order to reach valued functioning. Instead, Rawls (1971) states that we should be 
concerned with the distribution of primary social goods. Even though Sen is interested in 
equality of capabilities this doesn’t confute Rawls answers about primary social goods 
because how wealth, income, power, status, education, work is distributed has an effect on 
people’s capabilities.  Other approach has taken by Arneson (1989) who mentions 
opportunities for welfare, Dworkin cares about allocation of resources and also Cohen (1989) 
favors access to advantage.  
Dasgupta (1993) presented equity among individuals or groups as a measure of the relative 
similarity when the groups or individuals enjoy material resourses, education, socio –political 
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rights, health, education and technologies. It is concluded that equity is accomplished when 
each group gets its fair share.  
Rawls (1971) outlined the basis of a fair system: Everyone is entitled to basic liberties, is 
considered equal to others for that matter, and the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society is most important for fairness‐pursuing policies. Rawls proposed a fair 
procedure that it would lead to a fair distribution of primary and other goods.  His procedure 
based on the hypothetical scenario that a group of persons have to reach an agreement 
about their political and economic preference for the society. The proposed procedure 
argued that the final allocation of primary goods and recourses give an egalitarian 
distribution of outcomes.  
Instead of evaluating the distributions according to actual income economists (Dalton 1920, 
Sen 1973 1980) proposed calculating the utility that income will bring to each individual. 
Then evaluate the solution based on utility. 
Apart from fairness, efficiency is the most common way to describe a solution. It is usually 
measured by a central tendency measure, usually the average. Thus, distributions are not 
only evaluated about how spread is the personal income, but how much is to be distributed. 
This is the concept of Social Welfare, a combination of efficiency and minimisation of 
inequality, a central idea in economics. In this essence, we can’t be fair in a society level if 
we accept this society to administer less utility than we could. However, Sen (1970b) proved 
that having maximisation of goods under total fairness is not always possible. 
Other theoretical work includes Atkinson (1970), where he induced a set of inequality‐averse 
functions, the a‐fairness. This class of measures ranged from completely inequality‐aversion 
to utilitarianism.  
Lambert (1993) using Social welfare utility function discussed tax policy and tax reforms. In 
his final chapters, he discussed the impact on of tax to the entirety of the population. The 
distributive consequences of needs‐based approaches in redistributing utility are also 
discussed.  
Nash equilibrium (1950a, 1950b) has a notion of fairness between competitive individuals, 
where an allocation is improved if the percentage improvement of one individual is greater 
than the percentage decrease of the other individual. 
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Apart from numerical measures, outranking methods such as Lorenz curves or voting 
methods can be used for determining fair solutions. These methods cannot guarantee a 
single outcome as index measures do, but require a minimum level of assumptions. Lorenz 
and generalised Lorenz curves will be reviewed in a following chapter.  
2.3 Connection with OR 
In order to justify the use of fairness concepts in OR problems, an analogy between them 
must be made.  
Society has a number of different definitions. Oxford dictionary defines society as “The 
aggregate of people living together in a more or less ordered community.”  WorrdWeb 
defines society as “A formal association of people with similar interests” and “An extended 
social group having a distinctive cultural and economic organization” 
In that sense, every OR problem that includes a set of different entities can be a “societal” 
problem, and so be subject to fairness or other society related approaches. 
Entities in OR problems that could take the part of individuals, and thus making an OR 
problem societal may differ immensely. Those entities could be actual human beings 
constituting a society like nurse scheduling (Warner 1976). In facility location problem 
(McAllister 1976) where the subject of fairness could be groups of individuals that require 
access to a public facility. In portfolio analysis (Iancu 2014) where the investors split the 
market impact costs in a fair way. Even in job shop scheduling (Sabin 2004) fairness has been 
applied in accordance to scheduled jobs. The aforementioned research states that jobs that 
might take longer to finish are being “discriminated” compared to shorter ones and deals 
jobs in a fair way. There are different kind of individual or entities that could be considered 
in aspect of fairness in different OR problems. 
For example, in nurse rostering every nurse is part of a hospital, or a hospital ward. Even 
though nurses operate with different contracts and might have different preferences they 
work in the same space being restricted by similar rules and working conditions. Nurses have 
the more or less the same preferences on working conditions which they may vary, however 
they are more or less standard (Kovner et al 2006, Hayes et al 2010, Coomber 2007).  
A most important issue is the value upon which societies are evaluated. In Economics, a 
currency is used to determine fair or efficient distributions. For example, in nurse rostering 
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constraint violations is a negative “Utility” to be minimised. In job scheduling (Vasupongayya 
2005) waiting time (among others) is a negative “Utility” to be minimised. In facility location, 
utilisation of a facility is among others, a “currUtilityency” to be maximised. 
Social sciences examine the distribution of a quantity in a population comprised as a society. 
This quantity can take the form of happiness, access to healthcare, employment, quality of 
life etcetera. In economics, this quantity is usually a form of currency for example, Atkinson 
(1970). 
In both cases, this quantity represents a utility  ( ), where   is the individual, and the 
abundance of utility is preferred to scarcity (    ( )). The purpose is to evaluate societies 
in regard to the distribution of this utility. 
For example, in p‐median facility location problem, the various entities are assigned to a hub. 
Members comprise the society. Distance between member and the hub is the quantity to be 
optimised, thus the utility. The general direction is to minimise the distances between the 
hubs and the members assigned to them, (    ( )). 
A similar comparison can be made in a series of OR problems. 
Some OR problems are minimization problems. Utility in those cases is considered to be a 
negative quality (    ( )). This simply means that the individuals with lower negative utility 
are better off. 
Arrow (1950) proved that under a specific set of rules a completely fair system is not always 
possible to exist, and that may result to a “dictator” or a central decision maker. The will of 
the central decision maker can be simulated by an objective function. This objective function 
should include all potential goals of the decision maker, which can include fairness goals. 
In OR, fairness is confused with inequality. Even though the premise of equity is present, 
when fairness is mentioned, the goal is most of the times minimisation of inequalities (eg, 
Ouelhadj  et al 2012) 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter the basic notions of fairness, equity and equality were presented. Some 
examples of those concepts were presented in social science and economics disciplines. 
Differences in interpretations on every term were demonstrated. From the number of 
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interpretations in every case, it can be inferred that those concepts depend on the context. 
A groundwork of applying fairness concepts to OR problems was laid. 
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Chapter 3 Fairness in Operational research 
3.1 Introduction 
In operational research (OR) fairness is mostly interpreted as minimisation of inequalities. 
The research is mostly towards a set of OR problems such as scheduling, allocation, and 
facility location problems.  
Societal problems may include a large array of OR problems. Scheduling and allocation 
problems are the core of this set. The analogy between society and societal problems can be 
made on the basis that an element is distributed in OR problems the same way it is 
distributed in society. In society, economists and social scientists study about utility and 
welfare distributions. Usually utility is positive in the form of currency or some other 
beneficial value such as access to clean water. There are cases that utility is negative, such 
as child mortality (Rutstein et al 2004). In OR the positive utility that is to be distributed can 
take form of bandwidth in network allocation, completion in work scheduling, or even 
income in portfolio analysis. Some negative utility distribution cases are constraint violations 
in crew scheduling problems, or traveling tournament problem. 
Based on those principles, and on the premise that every set of individuals with a common 
characteristic or a common reference point can represent a society, it can be can evaluated 
an allocation based on either egalitarian or utilitarian characteristics. 
Until the recent years, the norm of evaluating allocations is based on Utilitarian approach. 
The most common concept was that the preferred allocation was the one that maximised 
the resources allocated. Some examples on this approach on societal problems are 
Workforce scheduling (Warner and Prawda 1972) location problem (Church and Revelle 
1974) airflow management (Bertsimas and Patterson 1998). In those cases maximising the 
average, or just the sum of allocated resources was the objective function of the problem.  
In OR the definition of fairness is vague. It usually takes the form if preventing inequalities. 
For example, in Rafaeli et al (2003), fairness in queues is considered the “perception of 
fairness” in individuals as the feeling each individual gets for waiting in queue. In Ee (2004) 
fairness is stated to be as resources in each node are “approximately equal”. 
The study of how the resources are distributed was effectively the egalitarian approach. In 
certain problems, the literature is bigger than others. In facility location problem a review of 
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the existing literature in fairness‐inequality measures can be found in Marsh and Schilling  
(1994).  
Rawls criterion (1971), for others max‐min criterion or Chebyshev max‐min, is the 
commonest fairness measure. It was first expressed in economics, and it is common in a 
number of applications in OR such as Nurse Rostering (Ouelhadj et al 2013) Academic 
timetabling (Mühlenthaler and Wanka 2013), Network allocation (Bonald and Massoulié 
2001, Arulambalam et al 1996), Congestion control (La Boudec 2005) and water filling (and 
Le Boudec 2006). Max min fairness concept is to improve the worst‐off member of the 
society. This has certain limitations. Judging a distribution by a single individual disregards 
the majority of members in a society, and the shape of the distribution. Also, expressing a 
result by a number that is not connected to a form of centre measure, disregards efficiency 
in the final outcome. It does not necessarily link to Pareto optimal solutions, and it is not 
scale invariant (see section 2.1). 
Another way of formulating equality is to consider equality as a form of deviation from some 
point, usually the average. For that cause, a series of statistical measures can be used. 
Standard deviation is the simplest of those. However, it does not comply with strong transfer 
principle. Variance on the other hand, is satisfying Pigou‐Dalton principle (1920). It has been 
included in a multitude of OR problems as a fairness measure such as income distribution 
(Atkinson 1970) Facility location (Berman et al 1990, Mcallister 1976) Job scheduling 
(Vasupongayya and Chiang  2005), Network allocation (Jain et al 1984). However, it is not 
scale invariant, and not bounded (see section 2.1). 
Apart from every statistical measure such as Deviations, Variance, Range (Gopalan and Batta 
1980, Muhlenthaler and Wanka 2012), Max‐min, normalised versions of those measures can 
be found, usually divided by average. This creates a series of bounded measures (Marsh and 
Schilling 1994 has a categorisation of measures) that is a very useful property in this form of 
Social welfare measures (see section 2.1) 
Gini coefficient is a popular measure in economics (Gini 1912), with an applied effect in 
income and tax analysis, but also in social sciences (Daly et al 2001) that is based on Lorenz 
curves. Applications in OR are diverse, Facility location problem (Drezner et al 2009, 
Yapicioglu and Smith 2011), healthcare applications (De Bruin et al 2010), and portfolio 
optimisation (Ringuest et al 2004).  
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Jain (Jain et al 1984) index is a popular measure in OR. It was introduced in network 
allocation, and has applied to personnel rostering (Ouelhadj et al 2012), academic 
timetabling (Muhlenthaler and Wanka 2012), Network allocation (Drougas and Kalogeraki 
2005, Shin and Lee 2005, Tang 2010 Belleschi et al  2011 etc). It is also used as a comparative 
quality measure between solutions produced by other fairness models. It is popular mainly 
in computer science related disciplines. 
Atkinson (1970) set of measures (or A‐fairness) is a set of utility social welfare measures. The 
difference from previous statistical measures is that incorporates efficiency as well as 
inequality measurement. Depending on how you formulate it, it includes max min fairness, 
average and Theil’s measure. It provides the decision maker with a choice of how much 
inequality averse or efficiency averse he wants to be. As social welfare measures, they have 
been used in cases that a total evaluation of the solution is needed Air flow management 
(Bertsimas 2011a), Healthcare applications (Bertsimas et al 2013 Leach 2011), Facility 
location (Yang 2011) 
An analysis for every measure is provided in Section 3.4 
3.2 Proposed Framework 
The majority of research work has been done to clarify the ways of evaluating societies. The 
differences between inequality, efficiency and social welfare have been studied. A list of 
measures has been investigated according to a set of properties.  
There have been many efforts to set a framework of properties for fairness measures 
(Bourguignon 1979, Trichakis 2011, Joe‐Wong et al 2011). Lee and Chiang (2010) proved that 
the only measures that comply with a certain number of properties including strong transfer 
principle were either logarithmic or power ones.  
In order to evaluate measures that are to be used in evaluating societies, a set of properties 
is introduced to form a framework. Depending on the problem, a fitting measure could be 
either social welfare measure or fairness one. In case of OR most problems need Social 
Welfare instead of fairness measures, in order to incorporate efficiency. Thus, the framework 
that is proposed consists of the following properties:1 
                                                          
1 In cases of fairness a needed property would be scale invariance and a desired one would be 
boundedness. Scale invariance ensures that the choice is invariant if every individual’s income is 
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Needed properties 
 Transfer principle (Pigou‐Dalton Principle) 
 Anonymity (Symmetry) 
 Boundedness 
 
Desired properties that are used to evaluate measures include: 
 Decomposability 
 Computational feasibility  
 Principle of population 
 Scale invariance 
 
The transfer principle (Dalton 1920, Pigou 1912) indicates that every transfer that improves 
a poorer person in the expense of a richer person leads to less inequality. In the same way, 
every transfer from a poorer person to a richer one makes society less equal. So, in two 
different ordered distributions, A, B, where   = (  ,… ,  ,… ,  ,… ,  ) and   =
(x ,… ,    +  ,… ,    −  ,… ,  ), where 0 <  <    −    is a positive value, and     are 
income values for the   people A would be considered less Equal than B. 
Anonymity (symmetry) ensures no inherit discrimination by any property. It implies that the 
identities attached on members of a distribution pay no role whatsoever in distribution 
comparisons. This is necessary even in cases that some people deliberately undermine their 
position in favour of the others. In such distributions, each person’s view about Utility or 
penalty is calculated before the final evaluation of the solution. While anonymity is a 
property mentioned in all the aforementioned literature (eg Bourguignon 1979, Joe‐Wong 
et al 2011) all equality measures seem to satisfy it. Therefore, anonymity is the property that 
ensures the existence of Fairness‐equity: Everyone should be treated equally, regardless of 
status.  
While it might be a controversial property, in the sense that some people might argue that 
some historical or other reasons are justification to treat people differently. This is more the 
subject of what fairness investigates. A small discussion is mentioned in 2nd chapter. In a 
                                                          
multiplied by the same amount. Boundedness is when a fairness measure values have an upper and 
a lower bound. In the process we evaluate fairness measures according to these propertie as well.  
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context of a specific problem, some amendments can be made in order to incorporate 
personal views. For example, in nurse rostering senior nurses, or nurses with families and 
therefore special needs, are treated differently than entry nurses, or nurses with no 
obligations. While this is always a matter that a decision maker should examine. A common 
solution is that depending on nurse’s needs, more or less constraints are imposed, and 
accordingly the value of a constraint violation might be different. 
Computational feasibility is referred to a measures computational cost: the ability to 
calculate the measure in a reasonable amount of time. In most approaches in OR and in this 
thesis specifically, a search function is performed a number of times calculating the objective 
function. In some cases (also see Chapter 6) calculating the objective function might be a 
large part of the time surpassing the time needed to perform the search function. In the 
scope of this work, each measure is run a specific number of times for two reasons: so that 
the effect of the measures complexity can be compared with the total run time and so the 
computational complexity of each measure does not account as a detriment to the quality 
produced by that measure. Insight for the calculation of computational feasibility is given in 
3.4. 
Decomposability states the worth of a distribution can be figured by calculating the worth of 
parts of the distribution. Additive decomposability will occur with the sum of mutually 
exclusive parts. Given 2 distributions A(a1, a2, ..., ai, ai+1, ... an) and A’(a1, a2, ... ai,ai+1+k, ... an) 
with a subset of distribution same to both allocations A and A’, and the remaining members 
have less inequality in A than A’, then distribution A is more equal than distribution A’. In 
cases of heuristic search methods, where the distributions occur with a small difference from 
a previous distribution, calculating the measure for a part of the distribution and then 
compose it with the rest may prove faster than calculating the whole measure from the start. 
The principle of population states that in case we scale the population in a distribution, 
creating a new one with more members of the same Utility then equality index would remain 
the same. 
By boundedness, Jain (1984) states that a fairness measure must be between 0 and 1. 
However, any measure with upper and lower limits can be normalised to [0,1] This way 
fairness can be expressed as a percentage. Fairness of 1 could mean a total equality, while 
values near 0 imply total inequality. This way, conclusions about the fairness of a distribution 
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can be made in a more intuitive way. If a fairness measure is bounded, a combination with 
an efficiency measure may lead to a more complete understanding of the distribution. 
With this framework, a few remarks can be made. A fairness measure is a Lorenz‐consistent, 
bounded, continuous, and additively decomposable inequality measure if and only if it is a 
positive multiple of a generalized entropy measure (Shorrocks 1980). Bourguignon (1979) 
proved a series of theorems for decomposable and symmetric measures. Lan et al (2010) 
proved that the only measures that comply with a set of properties (weak transfer principle, 
continuity, scale and population invariant and decomposable) are the ones with logarithms 
or power functions. 
3.3 Measure analysis 
Statistical measures 
Several statistical measures have been proposed in the literature. Several of them are easy 
to compute, however do not satisfy some of the properties proposed in the framework. In 
all cases below,     denotes the currency or utility. In nurse rostering context     denotes the 
total weight of constrain violations for a specific nurse. n is the size of the population while 
  is the average utility in population. In nurse rostering it is the number of nurses and the 
average constrain violation of the nurses’ population respectively.  
 
Average  
    =   =
∑   
 
 
 
 
 
The average has been used as a utilitarian measure (countries GTP), as well as a 
complimentary measure to an egalitarian one. In cases that the number of members that the 
Utility is distributed is unchangeable, the average measure can be reduced to just a sum of 
Utilities. In cases that the number of people in the population changes, average can be used 
as an easy way to measure total Utility, with accordance to the population. The distribution 
with the highest average always is Pareto optimum. 
Used as an egalitarian measure, the average is neither scale nor translation invariant or 
satisfies the transfer principle. Its use as a central‐efficiency measure is dominant, but there 
are arguments for other central measures, such as median or mode, as well. 
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Max-min (or min-max) 
  =    (  ) 
Rawls (1971) proposed this measure, with the goal to always improve the worst member of 
society. This measure targets the worst‐off member of the distribution, in a sense that “A 
dollar is a dollar for the poorest”.  
A transfer from a richer member to anyone but the worst‐off member does not contribute 
to equality. On its own it also allows wastage of resources. Max‐min is not scale invariant, 
nor bounded: If the utilities of the population is multiplied by a fixed number, then the 
evaluation of society according to Rawl’s measure will change. 
In cases that total Utility is a fixed number, this measure can sometimes lead to total equality. 
However, in cases of large problems using heuristic methods this measure may not optimise 
towards the right direction. 
 
Standard deviation: 
The Standard deviation of a data set is the absolute difference between that element and a 
given point. Typically the point from which the deviation is measured is a measure of central 
tendency, most often the mean (average) or the median point of the data set. 
  =  
1
 
 |   −  |
   
   
 
In either one of those points of measuring deviation, the transfer principle is not strongly 
satisfied. If utility from a richer person is transferred to a poorer person above the mean the 
absolute deviation remains the same. This measure is translation invariant, but not scale 
invariant. In comparison to variance, its sensitivity to large transfers from richer members to 
poorer members is decreased. 
Variance 
    =    =
∑(   −  )
 
 
 
This is a statistical measure that has been used as a fairness measure. It is not scale invariant, 
since if   every utility is multiplied with a fixed number the differences between them will 
20 
 
increase. It does satisfy other properties, like the transfer principle and the population 
principle. Values near zero signify larger inequalities in the distribution, while values near 
one smaller. 
This measure has the following nature: the transfer of Utility from a “richer” member to 
another member that is above average leads to a smaller difference from the transfer from 
the richer person to someone that has lower Utility than the average. This is a desired 
property in equality measures. 
Range (Difference between best and worst individual) 
  =       −       
Range is one of the simplest measures of distribution dispersion. It is the difference between 
the worst‐off and the better‐off member of society. It does not satisfy the Pigou‐Dalton 
principle. This measure is translation invariant, but not scale invariant. 
Even though it is easy to calculate, this measure only takes into consideration the two most 
extreme members of a society and it can be argued that it is inefficient.  
Gini coefficient - Generalised gini coefficient 
  =
2∑   ∗  
 
   
  ∑   
 
   
−
  + 1
 
 
Gini’s index is a measure directly derived from Lorenz curves (see 4.3): it is the area between 
the Lorenz curve of the distribution, and the equality line. It ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 
being total equality. Since it is based on a sorted allocation Gini index satisfy transfer 
principle, scale invariance and population invariance. However, it is not generally additively  
decomposable and sorting methods are expensive computationally.  An example of graphical 
representation of Gini  index would be in the following graph 3.1. 
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Figure 3-1Gini index 
Gini is one of the oldest proposed inequality averse measures in literature proposed since 
1905. There is a lot of research about calculation of Gini index (eg, Pyatt et al. 1980, 
Milanovic, 1997, Gastwirth 1972). The above calculation derives from  
  =
1
 
(  + 1 − 2 ∗ 
∑ (  + 1 −  ) ∗   
 
   
∑   
 
   
 ) 
and it is simpler in calculation terms. N again stands for the population,     is the income of 
the sorted individual  . 
Another way to view Gini index is as a function of a covariance 
  = 2 ∗
     ( , )
  ∗   
 
Where      ( , ) is the covariance between income and ranks of all individuals (Pryatt et 
al 1980). 
For the analysis of Gini index there is again a lot of work in literature. Bourguignon(1979) 
discussed about the additive decomposability, while Lerman and Yitzaki (1985) discussed 
about the decomposability of Gini using the covariance formula.  
Since Gini calculation through the analytic formula requires the use of a sorting algorithm 
calculating Gini can be time consuming for larger populations. Work that tries to bypass this 
issue includes, but not limits to Hoeffding (1948), Glasser (1962), Sendler (1979), Beach and 
Davidson (1983), Gastwirth and Gail (1985), Schechtman and Yitzhaki (1987). 
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Jain index 
 =
 ∑   
 
     
 
  ∗∑ (  )
  
   
 
Jains index is a bounded measure that is scale and population invariant but not 
decomposable. It ranges from 1 to 
 
 
.  One is the most equal solution that everyone has the 
same resources allocated. 
 
 
 would be the most unequal solution and would be close to 0 
(how close to 0 depends on the population size) where one individual has all resources. 
Regarding decomposability, if a subset ui of a distribution U is known and it’s Jain index value 
can be calculated, while Jain’s index of a complimentary subset uj ≠ ui is calculated, the Jain’s 
index of the whole distribution can be found as a function of uj and ui. 
Regarding other desired properties Jain index satisfies, Jain index is easier to compute than 
GINI since there is no sorting or some other complex algorithm. It is also scale invariant and 
satisfies the transfer principle as mentioned by Jain(1984). 
Theil’s measure 
 ℎ   =
1
 
 
y 
μ
ln
  
μ
 
 
 
A not bounded measure that can be transformed to a bounded measure if divided by ln(n). 
It satisfies every fairness property in the framework, however due to logarithms it has some 
problems. In case that there are some individuals or groups with zero utility the logarithm 
could not be computed. Also, logarithms are expensive computationally wise, and might 
prove ineffective. 
The logarithm, however, provide a very interesting property. The changes in the individuals 
in the lower part of the distribution are more important than the changes in the upper part 
of the distribution. This allows for a more inequality averse measure, that is targeted in the 
poorer population. 
 
Atkinson index 
   = 1 −
1
 
(
1
 
   
   )
 
   
 
   
       ≠ 1,  ≥ 0  
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A  = 1 −
1
μ
   y 
 
   
 
 
 
 for ε= 1 
 
Atkinson index is a set of fairness measures. Depending on ε it can take the form of a measure 
that is strongly utilitarian, strongly egalitarian, or anything in between. Some notable cases 
include  = 0 where it expresses the utilitarian approach of a measure, or average: every 
“point” of utility distributed is equally good for everyone regardless how “rich” or “poor they 
are. For   →  ∞  it is a normalised max‐min measure, also analysed above.   
Since Atkinson indices is a class of inequality measures, depending on the value of ε Atkinson 
index satisfies or not a number of properties. Decomposability is definite as well as scale and 
population invariance. Transfer principle depends on the choice of ε. It does not apply on 
either the extreme values of ε, but it may apply for intermediate values. 
The total welfare of a distribution can be represented as a function of welfare of each 
member (1) 
  =
1
 
  (  ) 
Where W is welfare, and the function of  (  ) according to Atkinson (1970) could be (2) 
 (  ) =
1
1 −  
  
          ≠ 1 
 (  ) =             = 1 
 
The base of Atkinson index is the concept of Equally Distributed Equivalent (EDE). EDE is the 
utility that if every individual had, then the whole population‐society level of welfare would 
be the same as actual incomes total welfare (Atkinson 1970). An example of EDE for a 
distribution of population of 2 presents to Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3-2Graphical representation of EDE 
Atkinson index derives from EDE as following (3): 
   = 1 −
  
  
= 1 −
    
 
 
According to (2),  (     ) =
 
   
∗(     )
    
From (1) and (2) we can get that (4) 
     =  
1
 
   
   
 
 
 
   
  
From 3, 4 we reach to the Atkinson index of inequality. 
3.4 Algorithmic analysis of measures 
In order to determine the computational cost and the time needed to calculate a measure, 
some algorithmic analysis must be made. Algorithmic analysis determines the number of 
operations in a given algorithm. The difference with big O notation is that it does not only 
determine an asymptotic approximation, but also the number of total operations for an 
algorithm. Another reason for doing an algorithmic analysis is that operation costs are 
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different depending on the programming language used. A computational cost analysis, 
based on some assumptions has been made. This analysis is provided in table 1, table 2 and 
table 3.  
It is assumed that any of the following processes are exactly one operation (Katajainen and 
Träff): 
 Loading or saving to memory 
 Increments by 1 
 Additions 
 Comparisons 
Multiplication and division is   ∗  operations, where n is the number of digits of the 
numbers. For the sake of comparisons, it is stated that   = 3. 
In some of the measures a sorting algorithm must be used.  The choice of the sorting 
algorithm is mergesort – since it is the one used by Java. The sorting algorithm is only used 
in Gini index and its complexity is calculated to 8Nlog    − 4 ∗2
       + 2  (Katajainen and 
Träff) .  
It is assumed that the logarithm is up to the 3rd digit. That makes out 12n operations (Hart 
1978). 
All computational costs were calculated using the algorithms in our experiments.  
Table one is describing simple statistical measures. Table two includes measures from 
economics and network allocation. 
Statistical Max 
min 
Avg Max Diff Absolute 
Deviation 
Variance Coefficient 
of variation 
Transfer principle       
Scale invariance       
Principle of       
Decomposability       
Pareto       
Boundedness       
Complete 
ordering 
      
Landau notation O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) 
Alg analysis 5n 5n 6n 10n 10n 10n 
Table 3-1: Statistical measures 
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Advanced Theil Gini 
coefficient 
Jain Index Atkinson 
index 
Transfer principle     
Scale invariance     
Principle of 
population 
    
Decomposability     
Pareto     
Boundedness     
Complete 
ordering 
    
Landau notation O(n) O(nlogn) O(n) O(n) 
Alg analysis## 20n 12  + 8nlog   
− 4 ∗2       
10n 10n‐3n*e 
 
Table 3-2: Advanced measures 
 
To conclude, measures like Atkinson index are descriptive enough without being costly. 
Measures that need a sorting function are maybe too costly for implementing in large 
problems. Most of statistical and advanced measures are not Pareto efficient without using 
a social welfare function. Statistical measures like average, min‐max, or standard deviation 
cannot be much faster than some more advanced ways of calculating social welfare, like 
social welfare with Jain’s index. However, for more accurate results, an application to 
problems is needed.  
3.4 Search method 
The basic simulated annealing meta‐heuristic used by the agents is implemented with a 
choice of a cooling schedule. After finding a feasible starting solution the algorithm moves 
to possible neighboring solutions. The move is always accepted if it leads to a better roster, 
and it is accepted with exp Δ/t probability if it leads to a worse solution. Δ is the difference 
in the objective function, where t is the temperature that decreases with a geometric cooling 
schedule, set at 0.9, gradually permitting fewer chances in accepting worse solutions. A fixed 
number of moves are allowed per run. The tests were performed in an HP EliteBook with 
8GB ram, 4x Intel i7‐3540M processor Each model for every instance run for a total 25 times 
to reduce the effect of randomness. SA was selected based on its performance in previous 
research (Martin 2013), as did the values for the cooling schedule. 
The tests were performed in an HP EliteBook with 8GB ram, 4x Intel i7‐3540M processor Each 
model for every instance run for a total 50 times to reduce the effect of randomness. 
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3.5 Conclusion  
Although there is some research in fairness and social welfare measures in the literature in 
both applications and theoretical work a complete investigation including most measures is 
yet to be done. A number of measures from economics and social sciences have never been 
applied in OR. This could be done in one or more OR problems.  
In case that this investigation has been done (Vasupongayya and Chiang 2005, Bertsimas et 
al 2011a, Ouelhadj et al 2012) it is done with a few measures, or measures from same set of 
functions, and there is no valid way of evaluating the results of the objective functions that 
are based on those measures. In order for the outcomes to be reliable a number of different 
problems must be examined. 
In this chapter we presented a framework to evaluate potential inequality measures. A list 
of measures was presented and evaluated according to that framework.  
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to present recurrent themes that appear in the next chapters. 
Information about the Nurse Rostering Problem and the benchmarks used will be provided. 
The search method used in experiments and details about it will be presented. Methods to 
evaluate and compare results produced by measures such as Lorenz curves (Lorenz 1905) 
ELECTRE method (Roy 1968) and a variation of ELECTRE will be introduced.  
4.2 Nurse Rostering Problem 
The majority of research on NRP has been with the goal of minimising the sum of soft 
constraint violations (Burke et al., 2001). In this work, the goal is to improve nurses’ 
satisfaction by either improving individual schedules, or eliminating the existing inequalities 
that can occur. This is done in the context of happiness satisfaction. 
4.2.1 Benchmarks Used 
In order to evaluate the quality of nurse rosters produced by the measures they were applied 
in benchmarks from Bilgin (2008). Those benchmarks provided 4 different wards with 2 
different scenarios: emergency, geriatrics, psychiatry and reception wards, with nurses 
having identical or variable preferences. The wards vary in parameters such as number of 
nurses needed, scheduling period, number of shifts and skills categorisation. The total 
number of constrains differ in each ward, with geriatrics ward being the most trivial and 
Emergency being the most complicated one. In the cases of scenarios with nurses having 
variable preferences, the constraints are personalised, but there still is a contract that is 
common for a set of nurses.  
Instance Nr of nurses Nr of shifts Nr of skills Planning period 
Emergency 27 27 4 28 days 
Geriatrics 21 9 2 28 days 
Psychiatry 19 14 3 31 days 
Reception 19 19 4 42 days 
Table 4-1: Hospital Wards in Bilgin 
The model was designed as such. A number of skilled nurses were to be assigned to a number 
of shifts. Those assignments must satisfy some constraints. Those constraints could either be 
hard constraints that must be satisfied in order for the final roster to be acceptable, or soft 
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constraints, where when not satisfied a penalty is added in the objective function. Soft and 
hard constraints are given in table 4.3. Apart from nurse satisfaction, hospital coverage 
constraints are to be satisfied. That means that all shifts must be covered adequately, and 
with nurses that are skilled appropriately.  
The mathematical model of nurse rostering has been given in Burke 2008 and expanded in 
Smet 2014. 
Notations 
I:set of nurses 
sk:set of skill types 
I  :  set of nurses with a skill type 
D: set of working days 
S: Set of shift types 
N    :Number of nurses with skill sk per shift in a day needed 
R   :Nurses absence requests 
R    :Nurses working requests 
I  : nurses working hours 
I  :maximum  desired consecutive days of working s shift for nurse I 
I  :desirable upper bound of hours in shift type 
Table 4-2: Nurse rostering Notation 
 
Nurse Rostering 
Hard Constrains Soft Constrains 
 A nurse can be assigned to 
maximum one shift each day 
 Coverage constrains 
 No consecutive shifts  Rest times honoured 
 Nurses and shift skill type match  Series Constrains 
  Counter Constrains 
  Multi skilled nurses 
  Successive series 
Table 4-3: Soft and hard constraints 
 
The constraints can be of different types: Single constraints, counters, series, successive 
counters or successive series. Table 4.4 presents the different constraints and what type they 
are. 
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Single constraint Counters Series Successive Series 
Request 
(absence/work) 
Days Idle Days Idle Shift Idle/ Shift Worked 
Collaboration Days Worked Days Worked Days Idle / Days Worked 
Training Hours 
Worked 
Shift Types 
Worked 
Shifts Type Worked / Days Idle 
  Shift types 
worked 
Weekends 
Idle 
Days Idle / Days Worked 
  Weekends 
Idle 
Weekends 
Worked 
  
  Weekends 
worked 
    
Table 4-4Categorisation of constraints 
Single constraints restrict the occurrence of specific events such as requests on working on 
a particular day/shift or request for absence for a particular day or shift. 
Restrictions on the number of incidents of specific subject in a limited period of time are 
called Counters. An example could be the number of total working hours within a week.  
Restrictions on the consecutive number of incidents of a specific subject in a limited period 
of time are called series. An example could be the maximum number of consecutive working 
days. 
Restrictions on the consequent number of incidents of a series of specific subjects in a limited 
period of time are called successive series. An example could be the number of days off after 
a period of working night shifts. 
Some examples of constraints are in the table 4.5, with bold being the hard constraints. 
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Constraint Description 
     ∗   
  
+    −   
  = 0 Workload constraint 
     
 
−    +       +    ≥ 0 
Limit on Standalone shifts 
      −    = 0 
Absence request Satisfaction 
∑     
  −   =0 Shift request satisfaction 
      −    ≤    
   
 Counter Restriction of 
(undesired) shifts 
        
 
−    ≤      
      
 Series of undesired shift 
        −    ≤ 2
    / ,  /  … 
 Working in weekends 
   |    −      |−    = 0      = 6,13,20,27
  , 
 Working both days in weekend 
   +    ≤ 1
 
 Working maximum 1 shift per 
day 
        +
 
      
     
+         +
 
         −    ≤   0
     
 
Number of consecutive shifts 
Table 4-5Nurse rostering constraints 
The objective function for all models is a function of coverage constraints and nurse 
satisfaction constraints.  
  =     ∗  
 
 =0
 
    =         ∗     
 
      
 
   =  ( ,   ) 
 
Where   are the weighted sum of constraint violations   .     is the sum of weighted 
constraint violations that are for coverage and    the objective function used in the next 
chapters. 
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4.3 Lorenz Curves 
In the following chapters a variety of different measures are going to be used as objective 
functions. Those measures are assumptions on the view of the decision maker, and are 
tailored to the decision makers’ preferences in each case. However, in the process of 
deciding what measure leads to better results some other methods are needed, while 
making the least amount of assumptions possible. Those methods are Lorenz curves, and 
ELECTRE method.  
Those methods can’t be used as objective functions. Both of them can lead to incomparable 
results, that would render the search process impossible. However, they can be used to 
compare the results produced by other methods. 
4.3.1 Lorenz curve 
Lorenz curve, introduced by Lorenz (1905) is a way of visualising distributions. It shows the 
cumulative proportion of sorted incomes. It focuses just on equality between individuals. 
Lorenz curve calculates the cumulative distribution of an allocation. It can be created by the 
following steps: First, the utilities must be increasingly sorted. Then the percentage of utility 
for every individual is computed. The last step is to figure the cumulative percentage of 
utility. 
Every distribution creates a monotonous curve with the first node at (0.0) and the last at 
(1.1). If the allocation is completely fair, then the curve would be a straight line (x=y) from 0 
to 1. The closer a curve is to the straight line, the fairer the allocation is. If distribution A is 
completely below (since deal with a minimisation problem) distribution B, then the allocation 
A is considered to be more equal than allocation B, since it is more equal for every quantile. 
However, if the curves are crossed no conclusion can be made. An example of Lorenz curve 
can be shown in figure 4.1. In this case, it can be seen that the results produced by “average” 
are less equal while results produced by “Atkinson 1.9” appear to be more equal than the 
others. 
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4.3.2 Generalised Lorenz Curve 
To have a more complete evaluation of a distribution, Lorenz curves are not enough since 
they don't incorporate an efficiency aspect. In order to incorporate efficiency (or welfare), 
Generalised Lorenz (GL) curves (Shorrocks 1983) must be used. GL curves are defined 
similarly to Lorenz curves: Again, the individuals are sorted in descending order. In both 
Lorenz and GL curves X axis represents the cumulative percentage of the population. In 
Lorenz curve Y axis represents cumulative percentage income while in GL curves Y axis is 
cumulative income. While in Lorenz curve the range of values in the Y axis is from 0 to 1, in 
GL the curve is from 0 to the total value of constraint violations. An equal distribution would 
still be a straight line. A non‐equal distribution would be considered better than an equal one 
if the non‐equal is wholly below the equal one(in case of minimisation problems).Again, if 
lines are crossed, no conclusions can be drawn. 
Generalised Lorenz curves are an interesting welfare tool: they account for both equality and 
effectiveness. An example of Generalised Lorenz curve can be shown in figure 4.2. In this 
example, while results produced by “average” appear to be less equal would be still 
preferable than all the other results, since the curve lies below all other curves. 
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Figure 4.4-2: Fairness Generalised Lorenz Curve 
 
4.4 ELECTRE method 
Another method to evaluate results is by ELECTRE method (Roy 1991). ELECTRE’s I goal is to 
develop and use an appropriate outranking relation between alternatives. The four possible 
scenarios considering two alternatives A and B are: 
 Alternative A is preferred over alternative B 
 Alternative B is preferred over alternative A 
 Alternative A is indifferent to alternative B 
 Alternative A is incomparable to alternative B 
 
To produce relationship, there are two main steps: The concordance, and the 
disconcordance test. 
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The concordance test is the evaluation of the evidence supporting the claim that one of the 
alternatives is dominating the other. This is achieved by checking the performance of A and 
B in the individual criteria. 
 ( , ) =   
 
 
Where   is the criterion,   is the set where    ≥     and  ( , ) is the concordance‐evidence 
that alternative A is better than alternative B. Values of  ( , )range from 0 to 1. The higher 
the value, the stronger the evidence that supports  ( , ). In order to formulate 
concordance a threshold s must be defined. If  ( , ) ≥   that means that there is concrete 
evidence that alternative A is better than alternative B. 
While concordance test clarifies the dominance of alternative over the other there might be 
some criteria that are critical to form dominance. If in those specific criteria the evidence is 
contrary to the ones obtained in the concordance test, a veto condition is imposed. 
  ( , ) =  
0       −    <   
1       −    ≥   
 
Where A,B the two alternatives,    is the veto for criterion  ,   ,    the performance of A,B 
alternative in criterion  , and    the veto threshold for criterion  . 
The scenarios described above are constructed as such:  
 
 Dominance of A over B if  ( , ) ≥   ,  ( , ) <   and ∑   ( , ) = 0 . 
 Dominance of B over A if  ( , ) ≥   ,  ( , ) <   ∑   ( , ) = 0. 
 Indifference between A and B if  ( , ) <   and  ( , ) <   or if 
 ( , ) ≥   and  ( , ) ≥   . 
 Incomparability if  ( , ) ≥   ,  ( , ) <   and ∑   ( , ) ≠  0 or if 
A if  ( , ) ≥   ,  ( , ) <   ∑   ( , ) ≠ 0 
 
In this application of ELECTRE I, the alternatives are the results produced by each model and 
the criteria are each nurses’ sum of weighted constraint violations. For each nurse  : 
   = ∑    ∈    
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Where c is the set of confirmed constraint violations for this particular nurse,    is the weight 
constraint violation  . So     is represented as the value of criterion   for alternative A in 
ELECTRE I terms. 
In order to use the ELECTRE I method the nurses are sorted by sum of weighted constraint 
violations, beginning from the ones with most constraint violations to the ones with least. 
This is needed for the weight determination (see 4.4.1) and reflects fairness: the ones with 
more constraint violations are the ones worse‐off. 
In order to obtain concordance, the same formula would be used: 
 
 ( , ) = ∑      where   
 ,   are the two different results obtained from different measures. 
   is the sum of weight, given for each nurse, based on the sorting position. 
  is the set where    >   , the set where the sorted “nurse” from result A, has less 
weighted constraint violations from the sorted “nurse” from result B. : 
   = ∑     ∈  ≤     = ∑     ∈    
     and    respectively are the weights for the constraint violations for the sorted “nurse” 
  for solution A, B. 
 
In order to produce the veto results, again the sum of weighted constraint violations is 
considered to be a nurse. In the use of ELECTRE I in next chapters (8.4.3, 9.5.3) the criteria‐
nurses used for veto was a percentage of the nurses with the highest sum of weighted 
constraint violations. A percentage was chosen because it would be expected in different 
populations to have different number of those considered “poor” or able to impose veto. The 
threshold was set as a factor of the performance of the other alternative’s (roster) criterion 
(nurse) in the specific criterion: 
  
  
≥   
This threshold ensures that in a number of sorted “nurses” the performance of solution A is 
not more than t times worse than the performance of solution B for those specific sorted 
“nurses”. 
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4.4.1 Fair ELECTRE method 
An issue that can be risen with ELECTRE method is the importance given on each criterion. 
Since the focus is mainly inequality concepts, the weights must be arranged accordingly. 
Determining weights is a complex procedure and can result to differences in evaluations.  
In order to incorporate equality concepts, the weight for the most deprived individuals 
should be increasingly higher than the least deprived individuals. The formula for the weights 
in the ELECTRE method was this: 
 
    =
(  −    + 1)
 
∑ (  −   + 1)     
 
Where K is the number of nurses,    is the sorted position of the nurse the weight is going to 
be assigned,   is the sorted position of nurses, and    is an equality factor. The higher   it is, 
the more inequality averse ELECTRE is. The concept of   as providing inequality averse 
viewpoints resembles the one from Atkinson 1971. This assignment of weights was 
introduced in Stillwell 1981, and while it has been used in multiple criteria decision making 
(Barron and Barrett 1996 Alfares and Duffuaa 2008), has not been used in fairness context. 
This formula can lead to a range of different inequality perspectives. If   = 0 the weights for 
each criterion would be the same leading to a utilitarian context. If   → ∞  the most 
important criterion is given 100% of the weight. 
4.5 Conclusions 
 In this chapter recurring themes that appear this research were presented. Nurse rostering 
problem was described. Methods to evaluate and compare results were presented. Those 
methods are creating a framework of comparing results produced by different objective 
functions, with minimum assumptions made. 
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Chapter 5 Poverty concepts 
5.1 Introduction 
Another way of measuring allocations quality is the concept of poverty.  In this case, 
individual utilities are compared with a threshold, the poverty line. Poverty line is a utility 
line that if an individual is below it, he can be considered poor. Being starved of utility, 
whether that translates to actual income, resources, preferences or some kind of goal 
satisfaction leads to entities that are not only dissatisfied, but also unable to function.  
Poverty consists of two different stages. The first one is identifying the individuals that can 
be described as poor. The second is to compare in which distribution there is more poverty 
between two different ones. Thus, the first one can be identified as “Identifying Poverty” and 
the second one as “Measurement of Poverty” can be described as a function of individual 
Poverty.  
As far the first question is concerned, there are a series of work by, among others, Rowntree 
1901, Townsend 1954 and Atkinson 1970. Defining poverty and the groups of people that 
can be considered poor is a major part of poverty research in economics. In brief and since 
it is not a part of this research, criteria for determining poverty can include means of 
sustenance, basic needs (clean water, housing etc) and clean environment. Size of a family is 
considered as well. Work has been made to take into consideration cost of living and the 
differences between countries or regions. The most dominant one is actual income. 
However, the principal and most interesting feature is the definition and outline of “poverty 
line”. 
Poverty line is a threshold which below that an individual is starved. With a poverty line 
defining a series of measures can be arise. The usual targets of the measures are to minimise 
the number and the intensity of the effects of those under the poverty line. However, in 
order to do that there are a number of ways or measures to evaluate poverty, some of them 
shown on section 5.5.  
The Poverty concept is different than inequality in a series of ways. The main difference is 
that in equality individuals are compared amongst them, while in poverty the main 
comparison is with individuals and poverty line. An inequality averse scheme tries to 
minimize differences between individual entities in a distribution. A poverty aversion scheme 
generally targets individuals that do not have enough utility to satisfy their needs. While 
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targeting inequality, an equal distribution may be reached while having unhappy individuals 
that do not have enough utility to satisfy their needs. Accordingly, when targeting poverty a 
distribution where everyone is happy ‐satisfying their needs – while being completely 
unequal might occur. 
Poverty presents with even more applicable issues than inequality and fairness 
methodology. The evaluation can again be either ordinal (Sen 1976) or under certain 
assumptions cardinal. Accordingly fairness measures are only interested in cardinal 
measures. The choice of the measures or of what is constituted as poverty can be subject to 
personal views. Also, the choice of the poverty line can lead to different evaluations (Foster 
and Shorrocks 1988b). Defining the poverty line itself is a matter of discussion. This creates 
a series of issues that make the use of poverty measures almost non‐usable in many OR 
problems, unless a number of assumptions are imposed. Another concern is that there is no 
generally accepted terminology, leading to different measures with the same name (see 
Beckerman 1979 and Clark 1981). Also, Poverty measures are non‐convex, that hamper the 
search procedure. 
5.2 Poverty concepts in economics and 
OR 
Poverty concept is originated from economics. Among the first mentioning poverty was A. 
Smith (1776), where emphasis is given at the changes of what is constituted poverty 
depending on the practices and the means of production on the era and the abundance of 
products. Karl Marx (1867) mentions that "in a given country, at a given period, the average 
quantity of the means of subsistence necessary for the labourer is practically known" 
implying an absolute poverty line. 
Booth (1889, 1891) was the first one to study poverty needs, and setting a numerical poverty 
line. An important aspect of his study was to survey the income and occupation of common 
people in London. Using the data from his survey Booth created a map that illustrated 
poverty rates in neighbourhoods.  
Frankfurt (1987) focuses on the premise that having “enough” is an adequate condition for 
equity. He discriminates between different views of having enough, from having sufficient 
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utility to survive to being satisfied with a state of affairs. Apart from connecting equity to 
poverty, these views on morality also imply differences on poverty levels.  
5.2.1 Poverty in applications  
The vast applications of poverty concepts are in the field of economics. A series of studies 
have been made to either evaluate a poverty line (Kilpatrick 1973, Rainwater 1974, 
Orshansky 1965, Rowntree 1901 Goedhart et al 1977) or to study poverty in a specific 
demographic area (Anand 1977 for Malaysia , Tsakloglou 1990 for Greece, Demery and 
Squire 1996 for Malaysia again, to name a few). However, in all cases the use of poverty is 
descriptive, where poverty through the years is shown and preferences are depicted. 
Kilpatrick (1973) sugests that poverty line raises when average income raises, using evidence 
from Gallup poll. Orshansky (1965) researched the poor between different categories (sex, 
race age, etc) and suggested that since we are dealing with varied poor population, a variety 
in measures is needed to reduce it, ending with the poetic “The poor have been counted 
many times. It remains now to count tl1e ways by which to help them gain a new identity.” 
Goedhart (1977) calculated the poverty line based on subjective opinions on what is 
considered poor. 
The concept of starvation of resources is applicable in a number of OR problems. The 
Lock/deadlock problems in Computer science, where processes that need a specific resource 
are blocked as a concequence of that resource is being used by another process (Holt 1972). 
This results to case where all processes are blocked and starved of resources. The solution 
for deadlock avoidance is usually algorithmic. The first solution for deadlock prevention was 
given by Dijkstra (1965).  
Applications include diverse problems. Some of them are: Risk management (Roy 1952, 
Fishburn 1977), Economic cases such as Social policy and planning (e.g. Ferrera 2005) and 
lock cases (see 5.2.2.1) such as Network Resource allocation (Litzkow et al 1988) and Job 
shop scheduling (Eg Glassey and Resende 1988).  
In Roy 1952, the safety‐first principle denotes that the gross returns should be no less than 
the expected returns. According to Atkinson (1970) this corresponds to the headcount 
poverty measure. Ferrera (2005) analyses southern European countries’ reasons behind 
poverty, those countries strategy fighting poverty and welfare state and compares them with 
other advanced countries (such as Scandinavian ones) using mainly headcount (see 5.6) and 
relative poverty (see 5.5). 
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Litzkow (1988) developed a system that identifies and prevents idle workstations. In Glassey 
(1988) a closed‐loop mechanism was implemented in order to enforce “starvation 
avoidance”. Queuing theory and inventory control concepts were adapted for a for 
stochastic Job shop scheduling problem. 
However, while there might be a few instances that poverty concepts are utilised, it is not 
widely acknowledged as such. While in fairness there has been a few instances where it is 
recognised as a desired property, poverty has not been accepted at all. Even though there 
are cases (see 5.3) where poverty ideas have been used, this is generally coincidental. 
  
5.2.2.1 Lock and deadlock cases 
A similar concept with poverty or starvation of resources is lock, or deadlock in several 
logistics applications. For instance, in Gold (1978), deadlock is defined as “a situation where 
one or more concurrent processes in a system are blocked forever because the requests for 
resources by the processes can never be satisfied”. Similar definitions were given In Moorthy 
et al (2003) “a situation where at least a part of a system stalls” and Kim et al. (2007 “a 
situation where one or more concurrent processes in a system are blocked forever because 
the requests for resources by the processes can never be satisfied”. 
Deadlock notions are present, apart from computing, in logistic problems. Manufacturing 
systems is a common application (Egbelu and Tanchoco 1984; Lim et al. 2003; de Koster et 
al. 2004; Le‐Anh and de Koster 2005). 
Deadlock handling for real‐time control of automated guided vehicles (AGVs) at automated 
container terminals deadlocks occurring in automated seaport container terminals, where 
quay cranes unload containers from vessels and place them on AGVs. Deadlock prevention 
in automated guided vehicles (AGV) is one common application (Lehmann et al 2006, 
Moorthy  et al 2003) 
Most of the poverty concept problems, like the evaluation or the status of poverty line are 
being overridden by the nature of the problem. Poverty line is set as the demands of a node, 
and most of the times a solution is simply not being accepted if a starved member exists.  
Even though the case of deadlocks and locks has similarities with extreme poverty, such as 
starvation of resources, critical methodological causational and solution approach 
differences exist. The “poverty line” is essentially the complete lack of available resources. 
In economics poverty is used as an evaluation tool. It is considered as something that is 
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undesirable but since poverty is used for evaluation rather than decision making, can be 
acceptable. When deadlock occurs in OR problems, most of the times the result is considered 
as an infeasible solution. The solution approach is always algorithmic: in most part of the 
research, work is being done to find the deadlock‐free solution, not quantifying the effect a 
deadlock would cause. This leads to a simplification of the poverty concepts. 
5.2.2 Summary – Connection with OR 
Any problem that can incorporate fairness or satisfaction can possibly incorporate 
“minimisation of dissatisfaction” (also see 2.3). Poverty can be possibly used in the same 
sense that fairness can be used in all “societal” OR problems. This leaves space for further 
application of poverty concepts as evaluation and assessment of distributions. 
Deadlocks have similarities with the poverty concept in the form of a general limited 
resources provided to entities. The main analogy is the ability to function on a satisfactory 
level when this luck of resources occurs. The difference between locks with poverty is that 
the former is an algorithmic concept, while the latter a decision making one.  
However, there are OR problems, where resource‐starvation free solutions would be an 
enrichment of the decision‐making process. Several OR problems can utilise the poverty 
concept, including recourse allocation problems, scheduling (ie personnel staffing), facility 
location and the rest of societal OR problems.  
MCDA problems also use utilise poverty concepts. Goal programming and the similarities 
between goals (see 5.3). Poverty can be identified by using multi criteria analysis, see Alkire 
2010. In this sense, poverty is more connected with MCDA more than any other part of OR. 
5.3 Poverty and goal programming 
In order to further the discussion between poverty and Operational research an attempt to 
introduce and parallelise poverty concepts and MCDM and in particular possible similarities 
or applications between goal programming and poverty. For instance, the poverty concept 
is close to Goal programming (GP): In GP the concept of “target levels” that must be satisfied 
is being used. An analogy can be made between maximisation GP problems and the poverty 
gap. In GP, there are cases where minimisation of the underachievement of a target value 
must be performed. This is equivalent with poverty gap: Target levels of GP and poverty line 
must be reached. Namely, for a series of goals with target level s, a goal could be formatted 
as  
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mina=  
w  n 
k 
 
s.t 
f (x) + n  = b ,q ⋲ Ν 
Where   ( ) is the value of the alternative in the   criterion,   the negative deviational 
variable or the under‐achievement of a goal    is the weight of goal   and   is the goal 
value. 
Considering the factor f (x) to be the income of an individual, b  as the poverty line, and 
the negative deviation variable n  as the poverty gap, the most common poverty measure 
can be constructed as such:  
G  = w  (z −   )for every u ≤ z
   
   
 
The above measure is weighted poverty gap, which appears in economics when household 
level data are being used providing more importance in larger families.  
The differences arise when the objective function is constructed. Both GP poverty measures 
use the deviation from a goal, but the aggregation of those deviations is different. In GP apart 
from the weighted sum the other two main variants (lexicographic and Chebyshev) are 
combining the goals with a priority concept. In Lexicographic GP a number of priority levels 
exist. In each level there is a number of unwanted deviations to be minimised. In Chebyshev 
(or Minmax) GP the maximal deviation from any goal is taken into consideration(see Jones 
and Tamiz 2010). When using poverty measures, a numerical function is constructed on the 
deviation of the poverty line is the only way to evaluate things, contrary to 
Chebyshev/lexicographic approaches of GP.  
While the simplest approach on defining poverty is to compare income with a poverty 
threshold, more indicators can be also used. For instance, Ravallion (1996) argued that four 
not purely income indicators can be used to measure poverty.  
Human development index, introduced as a term by United nations in 1990, in a project lead 
by Haq (1990). Bourgignon (2003) used processes to combine the information of different 
monetary and non‐monetary attributes in order to define poor members of society. Multi 
dimension poverty, introduced at 2009 by Alkire et al combines three different poverty 
“dimensions” ‐ criteria and their “indicators” –sub criteria in a weighted program with 
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identical weights for each dimension and indicator in order to identify individual poverty. 
This method is used by the United Nations Development Program to date. 
Those approaches resemble MCDA techniques, combining a set of Criteria into an evaluation.  
These techniques can be used not only in measuring poverty, but also identifying poverty. 
This creates an opportunity for a discussion, on the possibility of employing other functions 
in the context of GP other than weighted sum, like Watts index or Sen measure. The trade‐
off between complexity, accuracy and practical use could be a matter of debate. 
For example, using the squared poverty gap instead of weighted GP, the problem could be 
formulated as such: 
 
mina=  
w  n 
 
k 
 
s.t 
f (x) + n  = b ,q ⋲ Ν 
 
5.4 Poverty Framework 
There are a series of measures used in the literature ranging in complexity. The simplest one 
(headcount) enumerates the number of individuals below the poverty line, and more 
complex ones even incorporate fairness measures such as Gini. 
In this section the poverty measures used in the experiments, some general desired axioms 
are going to described, and the aforementioned measures according to those measures are 
going to be analysed.  
To begin with, the population of a distribution as a vector   = (  ,  ,. .   ) is defined. 
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that the elements of x are sorted. For any 
poverty line z, the individuals can be identified as poor or not poor. There are two definitions 
of poverty, weak and strong poverty. The difference is in the inclusion of individuals exactly 
on the poverty line in the set of poor people or not. In the weak definition, if    <  ,    is 
considered poor. In strong definition, if    ≤  ,   is considered poor. For future reference, 
unless defined otherwise it is assumed strong definition of poverty. 
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Like the fairness measures, there have been some efforts to create a framework for poverty 
measures. Beginning with Sen (1976) set up some desired axioms to be used in poverty 
measurement. Foster et al(1984) added to Sen’s axioms in order to create a class of poverty 
indices. A more complete framework was formulated by Zheng (1997), including desired and 
needed axioms for poverty measures. Alkire et al (2009, 2010) redefined the proposed 
framework to fit the concept of multidimensional framework. The main difference between 
desired properties in fairness and poverty is the existence of poverty line. For example, 
transfer principle in fairness examines if the difference between individuals is reduced, while 
in poverty generally if the difference between poverty line and an individual is reduced. 
However, there are many properties that are identical (Eg, anonymity, computational 
feasibility, principle of population). 
In this framework, a distinction between core properties and some desired ones can be 
made. The core properties are: 
 Focus axiom 
 Anonymity (Symmetry) 
 Principle of population 
 Continuity 
 Poverty line property 
 Transfer principle 
 Subgroup consistency 
 Monotonicity property 
 Computational feasibility 
All of those properties – even with different names ‐were proposed in Zheng (1997) except 
from computational feasibility. This is to be expected since the needs in OR and Economics 
are different. Feasible computational cost is more needed in optimisation than description: 
in optimisation a poverty measure must be calculated a number of times, while in description 
only one. 
The focus axiom ensures that the entities on question are the ones below the poverty line. 
It implies that distribution between non‐impoverished members is irrelevant to the 
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evaluation of the distribution.  Thus, an increase on the utility of a non‐poor person should 
not affect the total evaluation. This also implies that if more information for the total 
evaluation of a distribution is wanted some other measures or concepts must be utilised. 
Even though non‐poor members are not used in the evaluation of the distribution, 
information from them can be useful in other ways in the concept of poverty. An example 
could be the estimation of difficulty in eliminating poverty by transferring utility from the 
non‐poor to the poor. However, this is beyond the purpose of this research. 
Anonymity ensures that no one is discriminated against by any attribute such as name, race 
or ID. The same concept is used in this inequality framework.  
Principle of population is also required to be applied. It ensures that if a distribution can be 
replicated to a different size distribution with the same distribution, their poverty will remain 
the same. The same concept is used in this inequality framework. 
Continuity implies that every change on an individual below (or in the case of not restricted 
continuity, on) the poverty line would result on a change of poverty levels. The poverty levels 
are becoming progressively more severe the lower utility an individual has (Watts 1968). 
Also, small changes in an individual utility should not lead to a huge change to overall 
poverty. However, a poverty measure is not possible to be continuous on the poverty line 
when increased. A change on an individual from poor to nonpoor would necessary lead to a 
change on overall poverty. 
A change in poverty line could lead to changes to poverty, all other things equal. Zheng (1997) 
states that “increasing a poverty line would lead to higher poverty level”. Even when there 
is no change in status in any individual, increasing distance from poverty line would increase 
overall poverty. 
Transfer principle in Poverty frameworks is slightly more complicated than in inequality. 
Donaldson and Weymark (1986) identified four different cases in transfer principle, sorted 
by the weakest case to the strongest. The main point of those four transfer case axioms is 
that a transfer from a richer to a poorer individual should decrease overall poverty, while a 
transfer from a poorer to a richer individual should increase it.  
 Minimal transfer: 
Poverty decreases when there is a transfer from the richer to a poorer individual, when both 
individuals were, and remain below the poverty line after the transfer. 
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 Weak Transfer 
Poverty decreases when there is a transfer from the richer to poorer individual, while the 
richer individual could be either above, or below the line. The number of poor individuals 
should not change. 
 Regressive Transfer 
Poverty increases after a transfer from a poorer individual to a richer one with at least the 
poorer person is below the poverty line 
 Progressive Transfer 
Poverty decreases when a transfer from a poorer individual to a richer one with at least the 
poorer person is below the poverty line. 
Adopting a transfer axiom is a matter of debate. Sen (1976) suggested the use of regressive 
transfer axiom. However, since Sen’s poverty measure could violate it2, so Sen (1981, 1982) 
considered minimal transfer axiom as needed in a poverty framework, and regressive 
transfer as a desired property. Donaldson and Weymark (1986) proved that any poverty 
measure satisfying continuity and weak transfer would also satisfy regressive and 
progressive transfer axioms. 
Subgroup consistency axiom was discussed by Foster and Shorrocks (1991). It implies that if 
poverty changes in a subgroup of a distribution, while remaining the same in the rest of the 
distribution, overall poverty should change as well. It is analogous to Monotonicity axiom: 
Monotonicity examines an individual while subgroup consistency groups within a 
distribution. In that point of view, it has ties to decomposability, in the sense that groups are 
involved.  
Monotonicity again can be defined as weak or strong Monotonicity. Strong Monotonicity 
axiom states that a poverty index decreases whenever the utility of a poor individual 
increases. Weak Monotonicity axiom states that poverty decreases when the utility of a poor 
individual increases as long as this individual remains below the poverty line.  
By computational feasibility it is implied that the number of computational steps that are 
needed in order to evaluate a poverty index are reasonably small. In economic cases studies 
                                                          
2In a case where two individuals are poor, and there is a transfer between the poorer one to the 
richer one that levitates the richer one above the poverty line could be indicative that overall 
poverty has decreased.  
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there is usually a sample of entities that are taken into consideration (Foster et al 1984, 
Anand 1977), so calculating the value of an index is relatively trivial. However, when a 
poverty measure is used as an objective function, it can be expected that it will be executed 
a number of times, and depending on the  
Some desired properties could be: 
 Scale invariance/Translation invariance 
 Decomposability 
 Monotonicity sensitivity 
 Normalisation 
 Poverty/non poverty Growth 
Decomposability in poverty measures is similar to inequality measures. A decomposable 
poverty measure can merge the poverty index of a number of subsets to one, usually by 
adding them.  
Monotonicity sensitivity implies that a poverty measure should be more sensitive in the 
lower spectre of utility. It is the equivalent of Dalton principle: transferring utility from the 
richer to poorer entities will reduce general poverty.  
Scale and translation invariance in poverty measurement are again similar to inequality 
measurement. A poverty measure is scale invariant (relative) if there is not difference 
between a distribution, and this distribution scaled (multiplied). Translation invariant 
(absolute) is a measure that does not distinguish between a distribution, and a distribution 
that occurs by adding utility in every individual.  
Like inequality measures, Scale invariance is preferred: In real world economy, all things 
equal, it does not matter if one use Pounds, Euros, or Mexican pesos. Poverty line and all 
incomes should be exchanged in the respective currency. 
Normalisation in poverty resembles normalisation in inequality. Following focus axiom, if 
noone is below the poverty line poverty should be zero. Having an upper limit would facilitate 
analysis, like comparative analysis. 
Poverty (non‐poverty) growth states that every time an individual is added (or removed) 
from poor population, overall poverty will increase (or decrease). This crates complications 
with transfer axiom in some cases (Kundo and Smith 1983, Donaldson and Weymark 1986). 
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5.5 Poverty line  
Poverty line issues are a matter of discussion since the introduction of poverty. The first 
mention of poverty line is on Booth (1889, 1891) and it was defined as half of a pound to a 
pound a week. Booth considered this amount as "a minimum amount necessary for a family 
... to subsist". This arbitrary set of poverty line is a consistent feature to day. However, 
methods for choosing the poverty line have been proposed. 
Choosing the value of poverty line can have an impact on results. Foster and Shorrocks 
(1988a) showed that poverty measures and results depend on the level of poverty lines. 
Rawls (1971) implied a universal poverty line. Even though this works focus is not on poverty, 
but rather inequality, his target is “least advantageous people”. He claims that “all persons 
with less than half of the median may be regarded as the least advantaged segment”. This 
created a distinct trend of relative poverty that is continued to this day. Townsend (1974), 
Fuchs (1967) also proposed measures of central tendency like average and median. In EU 
legislation, the degrees of poverty are set as various degrees of the median equalised income 
(EU council of ministers 1975). Those poverty lines estimate the relative poverty within the 
population. 
Having a percentage of an indicator as the poverty line can have a number of advantages and 
disadvantages. A universal poverty line requires a minimal knowledge of the problem and 
the situation. In the case of economics, a relative income poverty indicator can be applied 
universally, in all countries. Considering OR problems it can be applied to a number of 
different instances and problems. 
Setting the poverty line as a percentage of the median could have some disadvantages. 
Accepting a specific percentage of an indicator (50% or 60%, or any other number) as poverty 
line is arbitrary. A poverty line that is a percentage on median could result to differences in 
poverty depending on the distributed utility; having a high (low) total utility/income would 
mean that the poverty line would be set high (low), without any difference in a primary 
characteristic such as real purchasing power (or in OR problems, real utility). Bradshaw and 
Mayhew (2011) present as an example the poverty in UK and Estonia: those countries both 
had the same poverty rate of 19% when the poverty threshold based on median in Estonia 
was set at 9770€ and in UK at 24380€. A poverty line based solely on income (or utility) 
without having some connections with a direct indicator lacks meaning: a poverty line should 
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represent a threshold that if crossed the individual would become deprived, unsatisfied or 
unhappy. 
In nurse rostering context setting the poverty line as a percentage of an indicator could 
represent a couple of different things. As in countries, constraint violations might not have 
different values in different nurse rostering problems, or wards. Setting a relative poverty 
line would eliminate those issues. Another view could be that a nurses’ threshold for 
happiness depends on the total happiness of the group. 
Following Booths’ concept of poverty line measured in absolute terms, United Nations and 
U.S.A have implemented standard‐absolute poverty line, based on actual needs of survival. 
It is set to be in a 1.25$ at 2005 purchasing‐power parity. This is a factual representation of 
deprivation threshold, based on needs. 
However, needs can also be subjective, or hard to define:  
A lot of research has been made to define poverty line in the field of economics. Atkinson 
(1970) treated poverty as a part of a political decision, where people were considered poor 
based on benefits rights. Kilpatrick (1973) and Rainwater (1974) determined a poverty line 
based on what the public opinion was on basic needs is using polls. Orshanksy (1968) and 
Rowntree (1901) set the poverty line based on what are the basic human surviving needs 
(housing, clean water, food etc). Goedhart et al(1977) introduced the Leyden poverty line 
method, a function based on survey questions. Among others, Atkinson (2003) Alkire et al 
(2009, 2010) proposed identifying the poor based on combining several areas of deprivation, 
resembling MCDA approaches. Specifically, in Alkire and Santos 2010 a set of 3 criteria 
(Health, Education, Standard of living) with 10 total sub‐criteria were weighted in order to 
determine if a family would be considered poor or not (also see 5.3). 
As in relative selection of poverty line, a same analogy can be made for an absolute value of 
poverty line. If sufficient research has been made to identify the impact of constraint 
violation and their tradeoffs, an exact value of total weighted constraint violations can be 
chosen. This leads to the same problems as with the poverty in the world, with an extra one: 
research for poverty line has been done for years from many economists in order to reach 
to a conclusion. It wouldn’t be reasonable to expect the same effort to be made in a single 
operational research problem. 
Rawlsian minmax measure can be a special reverse case of a poverty measure: What is the 
maximum chosen poverty line where there is no one that can be considered poor? 
51 
 
 max z ,where u ≥ z,∀i  
Poverty measures can be used with or complementary to inequality measures and social 
welfare: Social welfare can be again maximised, either subject to certain poverty levels, or 
used in a multi‐objective way combined with poverty. This may include again a lexicographic 
approach or a weighted approach. 
5.6 Measuring poverty 
Watts (1968) defined poverty measures as “a function of individual measures and the 
poverty line”. It indicates the intensity of poverty, or poverty level, in an allocation of a non‐
negative value to a set of individuals. Given a poverty line a poverty measure will evaluate a 
distribution with a numerical number. As in fairness, there is a diverse range of poverty 
measures used in the literature. A number of them are used in the following table (Table 1) 
The poverty measures used are presented in the following table. Note that measures can be 
continuous or discrete. Atkinson (1987) defined poverty measures in a continuous fashion, 
while more common is the discrete way (Sen 1976 ‐ 1979, Foster et al 1984, Zheng 1997, 
Watts 1968 etc).  
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5.7 Poverty measures 
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Table 5-1: Poverty measures 
                                                          
3 Other versions might include normalised deficit   
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Some measures are given in both continuous and discrete forms. The reasoning behind this 
is while most OR problems, and nurse rostering in particular have a limited number of 
individuals those measures were proposed to be used in countries with millions of individuals 
in question. 
 
Headcount/headcount ratio 
Head count is the simplest and most widely spread poverty measure. It represents the 
number (percentage) of people that are below the poverty line.  Because of its simplicity, it 
is the measure used by the U.S Census Bureau to determine poverty, and has been used in 
the past from United Kingdom, EU, and United nations as the measure of poverty. Headcount 
is also common in research on poverty (Demery and Demery 1991). However, since 
headcount only counts the number of deprived people, and ignores the severity of 
deprivation, using headcount ration might lead to misleading results. 
Headcount does not satisfy most of the required properties, for instance most versions of 
the transfer axiom, or strong Monotonicity. Since it is not distribution sensitive, it also might 
violate poverty line axiom. Headcount is also non‐continuous, and that can cause a series of 
issues when used. 
For example, and in NR environment, suppose that there are two nurses with the same 
preferences and nurse   having more constraint violations than nurse    with both of them 
being unsatisfied from their schedule (ie, having more constraint violations than acceptable). 
If nurse’s   shifts worsen (by getting more constraint violations) in the benefit of nurse’s B 
roster (so that nurse B gets less constraint violations) and both nurses will remain unsatisfied 
Headcount will not detect this change. 
Poverty gap 
Poverty gap is the other widely used poverty measure, representing the total utility that must 
be distributed to the poor members of the society in order to elevate them from poverty. 
Being a relatively simple measure, it is widely used together with headcount ratio, for 
instance, in World Bank Data (World Bank Group 2012).  
The income gap does not satisfy the weak transfer axiom, or strong monotonicity. Being a 
not distribution sensitive axiom does not satisfy monotonicity sensitivity.  
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Consider nurses   and    from previous example. If the amount of constraint violations 
traded between them is constant, weak transfer principle will not be satisfied:  
  = (  ,  ,…   ,…   ,…     ,  ) 
Where   is the number of nurses,   ,  ,. .  ,   the constraint violation of nurses,   the 
maximum amount of accepted constraint violations, and   ,    nurses that have more 
constraint violations than the ones accepted. If a transfer   happens between nurses  ,  
where  
  = (  ,  ,…    −  ,…     ,…     ,  ) and    −   >  , the result of poverty gap 
  = (  −   )             >  
   
   
 
will remain the same. 
Income gap (Sen) 
This measure, proposed by Sen (1976) is the product between poverty gap and headcount. 
It has been used in research, for example in Anand (1977, 1983) and Thon (1979). However, 
even though it is a relatively simple measure, it has not been thoroughly used in poverty 
measurement in societies. 
Being a product of poverty gap and headcount, Income gap violates all transfer and 
sensitivity axioms, while satisfies increasing poverty line and continuity, that headcount 
violates. 
Zheng (1997) claims that this measure empirically can perform on an equivalent level as 
other “good” poverty measures. 
Poverty gap squared 
Poverty gap squared, or poverty severity index (Haughton and Khandker 2009) is the sum of 
the squares of the poverty gap relative to poverty lines. It is a special case of FGT index, 
(Foster et al, 1984). It has been used in research (Jalan and Ravallion 1979) and has been 
mentioned in international organisations (Haughton and Khandker 2009). However, it is not 
as common as the previous poverty measures. 
Poverty gap squared does not satisfy weak transfer sensitivity, however at its ratio form 
satisfies all other properties. 
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Sen measure 
Sen measure was introduced by A. Sen (1976).  It is a measure that incorporates fairness, and 
as such is distributional sensitive. It can be calculated using the following formula: 
  =   ∗ 1 − (1 −   ) ∗
  
 
   
Where H is the headcount index, G is the Gini index amongst the poor population,    is the 
average amongst the poor population, and z is the poverty line. 
Sens index is not continuous, subgroup consistent, or satisfying strong transfer principle. 
However, since it satisfies monotonicity and minimal/weak transfer, and it studies fairness 
within the body of poor individuals, it has been wildly discussed in academic context (eg 
Foster et al, 1984). However, Sen measure has not been used in practice. Lack of continuity 
or decomposability could be reasons for that (Deaton 1997) 
Watts measure 
Watts measure is the sum of the logs of the ratio of poverty line by income. Watts measure 
was the first distributional sensitive measure that was introduced (Watts 1968). It can be 
transformed to a function of Theils’ index, as shown by Blackburn (1969) 
Watts measure, even though it satisfies all properties, it has scarcely been used in the 
literature. A possible reason could be that logarithms are computationally expensive to 
compute.  
Sen with Jain  
This measure has the same concept as Sen measure, but instead of using Gini index, Jains 
(Jain et al 1984) index is used. It retains the inequality aversion and monotonicity sensitivity 
properties.  
Jain’s measure has not been combined with poverty before this work. The reasoning behind 
using Jain measure is that it has common properties with Gini index (bounded, transfer 
principle) and could be used as a measure instead of Gini. 
Foster Greer Thorbeck 
Foster Greer Thorbeck (FGT) was introduced by Foster at al (1984). It is a class of measures 
that, depending on the α‐Factor, transforms to previously mentioned measures, or creates 
new ones.  
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The α‐Factor sets the strength of distribution sensitivity: the higher it is set, the higher 
sensitivity the index has. For   = 0, FGT collapses to headcount, for   = 1, FGT equals to 
poverty gap, and for   = 2 FGT is the squared gap. For cases where   > 2, FGT satisfies all 
desired properties.   
FGT has been studied in the literature (eg, Foster et al 1984, Atkinson 1987) but not 
thoroughly used in practice. An example of using FGT is Tsakloglou (1990) 
5.8 Conclusions  
In this chapter it is discussed the concept of poverty. While well documented in economics 
and social sciences, there has been very limited use of its tools in Operational research (OR), 
and those can only vaguely resemble the depth of analysis +that poverty concepts can 
provide in evaluating distributions. 
A framework for poverty measures was setup, similar to Fairness concepts. A multitude of 
poverty measures were presented and analysed based on this framework and their use in 
economic research. 
In this chapter the connection between poverty and OR applications is also presented. 
Poverty measures can be used as objective functions as they are, or in combination with 
other objectives, as a tool to evaluate distributions. This could add depth, and include the 
concept of minimisation of dissatisfaction in OR problems, where this concept can be fit. 
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Chapter 6 Inequality results 
6.1 Introduction 
While fairness measures have been used in practice in operational research (OR) (Bertsimas 
et al 2011, Martin et al 2012) there have been no efforts to evaluate the viability or perform 
an analysis of said measures. In order to investigate the properties of fairness measures, they 
were applied in Nurse Rostering problem. The goal of this chapter is to compare the 
proposed measures from literature with the existing measures from statistics.  
6.2 Methodology  
Since the goal of this chapter is to evaluate the performance of fairness measures coverage 
constraints were not taken into consideration. The rationale behind this is that fairness only 
results are not applicable since they overlook efficiency and general individual satisfaction 
(see 6.4). 
The objective function was set as the fairness measure, calculated for nurses. As described 
in previous chapters, each nurse’s sum of weighted constraint violations was considered an 
“individual” (  ) (section 6.3). 
6.3 Models 
Since the Nurse rostering problem is a minimisation problem, using measures that are 
applicable in maximisation problems would lead to results conflicting to fairness goals. 
While some measures can be the same to both minimisation and maximisation problems, 
like average or deviation, changes must be made to other measures in order to adapt. 
For example, Jains index numerator and denominator are swapped. The logic behind this is 
that when trying to minimize an objective that would otherwise be desired to be maximised, 
minimising the inverse would be preferable.  
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Measure Objective function 
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Table 6-1: Fairness measures 
Where    is the sum of constraint violations for nurse  ,   is the average constraint violations 
for nurses (or      ) and   is the number of nurses. 
Theils’ and Atkinson measure were also reversed. The results support those transformations. 
Gini index, derived from Lorenz curves also changes. Lorenz curves in maximisation problems 
are below the equality line. 
GINI index would be the area that is above the equality line and below the line of other 
allocations. The function that calculates it does not change substantially. 
6.4 Evaluation 
In this section the objective functions used were set to strictly minimise inequality. The 
rosters produced would not be accepted by any nurse, but the results are interesting in the 
scope of maximising fairness in an environment. The tool to compare equality between 
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individuals are Lorenz curves (Figure 6.1) (see 4.3.1). The measures and objective functions 
used were the ones presented in table 6.1. 
Lorenz curves were also used to compare results (4.3). The adaptation of Lorenz curves in 
minimisation problems is that Lorenz curve lies above absolute equality instead of below it: 
in every possible allocation the individuals would have more, or at best the same, constraint 
violations than the constraints violations in individuals in the most equal allocation. Again, 
like maximisation problems if two curves are crossed no dominance can be established. 
 
The Lorenz curves are grouped into 3 distinct groups. Average is the least equal between 
them as expected. The curves that are somewhat closer to the equality line are the ones 
produced by Minmax and Max difference. All the other results were really close to equality 
line, but still some of their Lorenz Curves were Crossed. The result from “Atkinson index 0.1” 
provided the results that were the least inequalities, according to Lorenz Curves since the 
curve produced by it was the one closer to the equality line at all times without crossing with 
any other. The results produced by “Atkinson index 1.9” were the second most equal, again 
without crossing with any other line. 
The Lorenz curves of Atkinson 0.99999, 1.00001 and Gini were crossed. In the six worse off 
nurses, Atkinson 1.00001 was better (lower). Then at the point the 7th nurse the curve for 
Atkinson 0.99999 was lower than the others. At the point of 8th to the 13th nurse Gini curve 
was preferred. The rest of the curve saw a couple of crossings between Gini and Atkinson 
1.00001, making the results below the two first incomparable. 
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Some evaluation must be made for efficiency, using Generalised Lorenz curves. Contrary to 
the equality results, Average had the best performance, being lower than the other curves. 
Then the MinMax and Max difference measures followed. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Fairness Generalised Lorenz Curve 
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By observing Lorenz curves, it is apparent that all measures apart from average are not 
performing well in efficiency. This is normal, since they are only optimizing equality, that is 
somewhat in contrast with efficiency (Bertsimas et al 2011). 
Another aspect of the solution is the computational time. The results in the table below show 
the time required for the whole run: this includes the calculation of the objective function as 
well as the calculation of each constraint violation. According to 3.4, it would be expected 
that Gini index would be more time consuming than the rest of the measures, and simple 
measures such as average, minmax or Max difference would require considerable less time. 
However, since the evaluation of the constraint violations is far more time consuming than 
the evaluation of just the objective function there are no noticeable differences. Also, the 
moves used in order to generate different solutions (for example swap or delete) effects 
possible differences in time required for each run. From table 6.2 we can assume that in 
cases where there is a extensive computational cost until calculating the objective function, 
computational cost differences between different fairness measures are rather unimportant. 
Objective Function Time required for each run 
Average 0.118506236 
MinMax 0.11505 
Deviation 0.11538 
Max difference 0.104949003 
Gini index 0.103509555 
Jain index 0.100039726 
Theil's index 0.09772675 
Atkinson index 0.1 0.10222906 
Atkinson index 0.9999 0.103170273 
Atkinson index 1.00001 0.100070801 
Atkinson index 1.9 0.099782517 
Table 6-2: Computational cost 
6.5 Conclusions 
The new measures can produce way more equal results than the ones used in the literature 
before. In the following Chapters, the three cases using an outranking method are presented. 
Atkinson index, in its various forms, produced the most equal results.  
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Chapter 7 Poverty in Nurse Rostering 
Problem 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Nurse rostering problem (NRP), as an application that involves individuals, can utilise the 
poverty concept. 
NRP is modelled as constrain violation problem. Each nurse has some preferences about 
shifts, working days and a series of other scheduling options. Every one of those options that 
are not satisfied invokes a constraint violation penalty. The sum of constraint violations for 
each nurse constitutes the total negative utility imposed on this nurse. The most common 
evaluation of this model was to sum the total of each nurses constrain violation, as well as 
the hospital needs for manpower. The sum represents the efficiency of the roster, and for 
most of the cases it is considered to maximise the happiness within the workforce. However, 
what it actually does is to try to minimise the nurses’ undesirable shifts, thus minimising the 
total nurses’ unhappiness. 
While minimising total nurses’ unhappiness is a common goal, this goal does still leave cases 
of extreme unhappiness that are not targeted when trying to minimise the total 
unhappiness. If someone assumes that there is a point upon which the unhappiness can 
affect performance where unhappiness bellow that point does not, there is a point on 
minimising this extreme unhappiness. 
The approach proposed in this chapter is slightly different in conception by setting up a 
threshold on constraint violations upon which a nurses’ condition changes from satisfied 
towards unsatisfied. Depending on the schedule, most nurses are willing to accept certain 
inconvenient shifts up to a point. This point can be related to the poverty line in economic 
situations. Thus, a model can be established that resembles poverty, or minimisation of 
dissatisfaction. 
In this context, poverty (or resource starvation) can be used to minimise the extreme (or not 
so extreme) unhappiness. Like in economics, two are the main issues that arise. The level of 
the poverty line (or unhappiness line) and how poverty line is utilised to produce some 
meaningful results. In order to evaluate an allocation, a series of possible measures can be 
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used. Depending on the desired effect on the various degrees of starved members the 
appropriate measure should be used.  
Every nurses’ sum of constrain violation is compared with the poverty line. Since it is a 
minimisation problem, in contrast with economics, a nurse is considered starved if this sum 
exceeds the poverty line. This means that the proposed measures should be transformed in 
order to apply in minimisation problems. 
The selection of poverty line can be again a point of discussion. Since there are no hands‐on 
data on what point of nurses’ sum of constrain violation a nurse is unable to perform, a series 
of experiments must be done to discover an acceptable point and investigate the effect on 
the line on nurses’ happiness. Again, poverty line can be absolute or relative. By absolute 
poverty line it is described as an exact number ‐arbitrary or not. Relative poverty line is 
defined as a percentage of a central indicator (average or median) of the current allocation. 
Another issue that can arise in Nurse rostering problem, is the evaluation of both the nurses’ 
general happiness and satisfying hospitals’ needs. This can be determined by a number of 
ways. The simplest one is to disregard nurses’ or hospitals’ needs. Finally, some thresholds 
can be established for either nurses or hospital satisfaction, and those can be used as hard 
constraints, Simulating an economic situation, where the amount of resources is limited. 
The final approach has some merit in poverty aversion environment. Since the resources 
distributed in nurses would be accordingly reduced depending on the level of the 
aforementioned threshold, poverty line definition would be more important. 
In this chapter it is presented that poverty concepts can be used in an OR problem. The 
experiments also show the importance of choosing the correct parameter values.  
7.2 Experiments methodology 
Since in poverty every individual nurse is compared with poverty line ‐ a fixed value‐ there is 
another way to present results. The first of the graphs in every case is a representation of 
individual nurse constraint violations in the y axis, and the number of nurses (sorted) in the 
x axis. Presenting results in such a way makes it easier to compare with poverty line. Lorenz 
curves are included, similarly to other chapters. 
The poverty measures that were used were:  
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Measures Used 
Sum 
Jain 
Headcount 
Normalised Poverty Gap 
Squared Poverty gap 
Watts measure 
Income Gap (sen) 
Sen measure (with Gini) 
Sen Measure (with Jain) 
Foster‐Greer‐Thorbecke 3 
Table 7-1: Poverty measures used 
 
The methodology is similar to the previous chapters. Two sets of experiments were 
performed. The first set of results used only poverty measures, without evaluating any other 
aspect of the roster. The goal of those tests was to research the use of poverty measures as 
social welfare measures.  
7.3 Results  
The poverty line issue was addressed in threefold manner. The first set of experiments were 
made with a fixed number of weighted constrain violation penalties sum as a poverty line. 
This approach translates to the real‐world analogy that a nurse that has more than a certain 
number of undesired shifts will be unhappy.  Since the constraint violation sum is the 
depiction of a nurses’ unhappiness, it would make sense to limit this unhappiness. The 
poverty line should be chosen to accommodate those needs. A fixed number could be 
appropriate in this context.  However, since the instances range from simpler with a small 
number of constrains to more complex with a large number of constrains this approach can 
lead to a pitfall.  
The other set of experiments were performed with poverty line being correlated to how 
complex an instance is. Poverty line were set to be a percentage of constrain violations from 
an ideal solution. The results from previous chapters were used in order to find the minimum 
number of total constrain violations. Different percentages of the best result were used. Even 
though there is no real‐world analogy, those results are based on the tailored needs on each 
instance. This poverty line approach is in accord to Sen seeing the poverty line set as a 
percentage of the average income. 
Finally, in the third set of results coverage constraints were included. Since a number of 
assumptions would be needed in order to aggregate individual and coverage constraint 
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violations, coverage was considered hard constraint: being over an anti‐ideal point (see 
chapter 9) a very large penalty on the objective function was imposed. In this set of 
experiments, the poverty line was again set at a specific point, similarly to the first set. 
All of the following results are from the first instance (emergency). 
7.3.1 Absolute poverty 
In the first set of results the poverty line was set relatively approximatively. In order to set a 
poverty line that reflects the needs of nurses based on the constraint violations on certain 
preferences a lot of research must be done. Firstly, to correctly set the individual preference 
weights then individual weights to calculate utility for each nurse. Then, evaluation for what 
is the real weighted constraint violation limit that if surpassed a nurse will be so unhappy 
that will not be able to function properly. 
In order to set a poverty line even with that research, some assumptions are expected to be 
made. What is the “unhappiness” function, and how it relates to utility? What is this limit 
that a nurse being so unhappy that will not be able to function properly? Does this limit 
depend on the individual? In economics, there is a lot of research for setting poverty line, by 
a lot of scientists. Expecting the same amount of research for a OR problem would be 
unreasonable 
The research done to set the poverty line in the next 2 examples (poverty line 3000 and 5000) 
was less exhaustive. Since selecting a poverty line based on previous results (see 7.3.2) would 
be similar to the “relative” poverty approach, poverty line could not be based at previous 
results, at least not in a direct manner. The next numbers are thus selected in an arbitrary 
manner. Experiments were done for poverty line set to 1000,3000 and 5000. Results for 
poverty line set to 1000 were as expected and since no measure managed to have individuals 
so low they are not being presented in this thesis. Selecting poverty line of 1000‐3000‐5000 
provide a range of poverty lines that allows us to evaluate the performances of measures 
depending on the setting of poverty line. 
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Case 1: absolute poverty, poverty line set at 3000 
 
Figure 7-1:Poverty results with Line set to 3000 
It is interesting to note that Jain is the only measure constantly below Poverty line. 
Normalised poverty gap only has 1 nurse above the poverty line while watts has 3, sum 5. 
FGT, income gap, Sen measure with Gini and squared poverty gap are always above poverty 
line. 
 
Figure 7-2:Lorenz Curve with Poverty line set to 3000 
The GL curves are quite clear, with not so many points where they cross. Sum is the lowest 
curve, therefore the best, followed by Jain, normalised poverty gap, watts measure, 
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headcount and then Sen measure with Jain. Income gap (Sen), Squared poverty gap, FGT3 
and Sen with Gini all cross and are the highest ones. 
 
 
Figure 7-3Poverty results with poverty line set to 5000 
With the poverty line set to 5000 more measures have results with many individuals lower 
than the poverty line. Watts measure, normalised poverty gap and Jain were all below the 
poverty line. Sum only had one individual above the poverty line. Income gap had all 
members above poverty line.  
 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27S
u
m
 o
f 
co
n
st
ra
in
t 
vi
o
la
ti
o
n
s 
fo
r 
n
u
rs
e
Sorted Nurse number
Poverty line 5000
Sum Jain Headcount
Normalised Poverty Gap Squared Poverty gap Watts measure
Income Gap (sen) Sen measure (with Gini) Sen Measure (with Jain)
FGT 3 Poverty Line
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
C
u
m
u
la
ti
ve
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
 c
o
n
st
ra
in
t 
vi
o
la
ti
o
n
s
Sorted Nurse number
Lorenz poverty line 5000
Sum Jain Headcount
Normalised Poverty Gap Squared Poverty gap Watts measure
Income Gap (sen) Sen measure (with Gini) Sen Measure (with Jain)
FGT 3
68 
 
Figure 7-4:Lorenz Curve with Poverty line set to 5000 
Sum was the Measure with the lowest Lorenz curve at all points, followed by Jain. Sen 
measure with Jain, Foster‐Greer‐Thorbecke 3, Headcount, Normalised poverty gap and 
Watts measure all crossed. Sen measure with Gini, squared poverty gap and Income gap 
were the group of 3 worst measures.  
Some conclusions that can be drawn from the above experiments are that poverty measures 
even achieve the goal of being below the poverty line at cases. Utilitarian (sum) and Social 
welfare function (Jain) (see chapter 8) measures managed to be below the poverty line in 
more cases than the poverty measures. Measures such as headcount that is unable to take 
into consideration changes other than the passing of poverty line underperform when 
drawing the GL curves. A reasoning behind that is that headcount is not continuous, and the 
search function might hinder the optimisation. 
However, it is noted that with higher poverty line more measures seem to reach the goal of 
being below the poverty line even though that generally does not improve results (as can be 
seen by the comparison of GL curves). A conclusion that can be drawn is that even though 
the actual happiness did not increase, setting the levels of unhappiness can affect perceived 
happiness. 
It is also noted that more complicated measures such as Sen measure, squared poverty gap 
and FGT severely underperform by in cases, not having a single member under poverty line.  
7.3.2 Educated Absolute Poverty 
The above poverty lines were selected rather arbitrary. There is no clear indication that 
suggest towards the use of those selected lines. In this section, an educated guess will be 
made to select poverty lines.  
In this section results from previous experiments are being used in order to assign poverty 
lines. While in relative poverty in economics poverty line is set as a percentage of a central 
tendency measure of the whole distribution (usually the average) that would not be possible 
in OR context. In economics the goal of setting a poverty line is to ultimately describe a 
distribution based on that poverty line, while in this thesis the goal is to decide what 
distribution is better. Setting the poverty line based on a current distribution, and then 
evaluating the distribution on the grounds of individual comparisons to the poverty line 
would create two conflicting goals in the shape of one, and could not direct the objective 
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function. The expected result would be, depending on the measure, to have some individuals 
with being way higher than the poverty line and some just below the poverty line. 
However, since we have no data on preferences for the threshold of dissatisfaction of nurses’ 
results from previous experiments can be used. Experiments were made (see chapter 9) in 
order to find ideal and anti‐ideal points for several measures, including the average 
constraint violations of nurses. The anti‐ideal point for efficiency was calculated in 
comparison to coverage constraints. Experiments were made with average nurse constraint 
violations and coverage constraint violations where weights for each were set high (0.99) 
and low (0.01) respectively. Those are the best (and worse) acceptable values for average 
and coverage.  
Being consistent with relative poverty theme, the poverty line selected in the next 
experiments were set to be a percentage of the ideal and anti‐ideal point. In the first example 
(5475) poverty line is the sum of constraint violations of the anti‐ideal point divided by the 
number of individuals, having the poverty line set to be at 100% of the worse possible 
allocation for nurses. In essence, this poverty line represents the sum of constraint violations 
each nurse would have in a completely equal distribution of the worse acceptable 
distribution for nurses’ satisfaction. 
 
Figure 7-5:Poverty results with poverty line set to 5475 
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With poverty line set to 5475 Jain, normalised poverty gap and watts measure were the ones 
having all nurses below poverty line. Sum only had one nurse above the poverty line. All 
measures had at least 3 individuals below the poverty line.  
 
Figure 7-6: Lorenz Curves with poverty line set at 5475. 
Sum was the lowest Lorenz curve, followed by Jain. Watts had a high Lorenz curve but by the 
end it was the 4th lowest one as did Normalised poverty gap being 3rd at the end. Headcount 
and normalised poverty gap were really close until the 19th nurse where Headcount started 
to rise. 
In the second part of those experiments, the poverty line was set to be the average sum of 
constraint violations for nurses. This poverty line is based on the best acceptable results for 
the group of nurses if someone only focuses on the efficiency of their roster. In essence the 
poverty line is the sum of weighted constraint violations that each nurse would have in a 
completely equal best acceptable distribution. It would be expected that this poverty line is 
relatively low, since it is based on the best results for nurses. 
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Figure 7-7:Poverty results with poverty line set to1927 
Since 1927 is a relatively low for this instance, it was expected that not many individual 
nurses were above poverty line. Not even Jain and Sum that were entirely below poverty line 
in the other experiments were, with sum having nine individuals above poverty line, Watts 
seven and Jain 17. Headcount, Income gap (Sen), FGT3, Squared poverty gap and Sen 
measures (with Gini and Jain) had no individual above poverty line.   
 
Figure 7-8: Lorenz Curves with poverty line set at 1927. 
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Sum was the Lowest curve when setting poverty line at 1927, followed by Jain, Watts and 
normalised poverty gap. Headcount (that performed better at first nurses) income gap 
(better at the first and last nurses) and FGT followed crossing between them. Sen measure 
with Gini, Jain and Squared poverty gap followed being higher than all curves. 
The results are similar to the previous section. Having poverty line set higher allows for more 
individuals to be below poverty line, but did not really improve Lorenz Curves. Some Lorenz 
curves are better when setting higher poverty line than lower. This might be happening 
because of the search function: if there is not an apparent improvement in the objective 
function leading the direction to a better solution, the search stagnates and ultimately 
produces worse results. Better performing poverty measures such as Watts and Normalised 
Poverty gap converge to the poverty line. Again, the perceived improvement on the 
extremely unhappy does not mean an improvement on the actual constraint violations. 
7.3.3 Experiments with resource constraints 
The second part of the experiments is made to create a roster that is effective to both the 
nurses and the wards. The procedure is similar to the previous chapter. Poverty line were 
selected to be 3200. This number is somewhat in the middle between the highest and lowest 
poverty lines used in this thesis. The poverty models were tested in contrast to the ward 
efficiency. In order to simplify things, Ward coverage was considered a hard constraint, set 
at a previous found anti‐ideal point. 
The difference between those experiments with the previous chapters is the inclusion of 
coverage constraints. In the previous chapters coverage constraints were ignored. However, 
the approach of coverage constraints in this chapter is different than the others. 
In chapter 8, coverage constraints were aggregated with nurse constraint violations. Even 
though they were treated as different, the sum of weighted coverage and nurse constraint 
violations were used as the objective function. In chapter 9, coverage was a separate goal to 
optimise, and then depending on the model (minmax or weighted) was included in the 
objective function. 
The concept of coverage constraint violations in this chapter is entirely different. Coverage 
cannot be treated as another nurse, setting poverty line to be evaluated upon. That would 
create difficulties in creating the model, such as the relative weight of nurse and coverage 
constraint violations, the poverty line of coverage etc. so coverage constraints were treated 
different than other chapters. A limit upon that once surpassed a great penalty on the 
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objective function was imposed, making it a hard constraint. However, if this limit was not 
surpassed coverage was not included in the objective function.  
 
 
Figure 7-9: Poverty results with Hard constraints 
Having low and hard coverage constraints even less individuals were above the poverty line. 
11 nurses from sum, 12 from Watts, and 16 nurses from Jain measure were above the 
poverty line. Measures such as Income Gap (sen), FGT3, Sen measure (with Jain and Gini) 
and squared poverty gap had no individual below the poverty line.  
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Figure 7-10:Lorenz Curve with Hard Coverage Constraint 
 
As in previous cases, Sum was the one with the lowest Lorenz curve at all points. Watts, 
normalised poverty gap and Jain form another group, only surpassed by headcount in the 
first 3 nurses. Sen measure with Jain and Gini, as well as squared poverty gap were the higher 
Lorenz curves. 
The results on poverty under hard coverage constraints confirm the suspicions: overall 
results are slightly worse than the cases where no hard constraints on coverage were 
implemented. However, in one case a feasible solution was not found (squared poverty gap). 
Generally, imposing hard coverage constraints did affect the quality of nurse results, in both 
minimising unhappiness  and the results presented in GL curves. This could go well with a 
real world analogy: having limited recourses makes poverty harder to deal with than having 
infinite recourses.  
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Measure Coverage 
Constraints 
Sum 8000 
Jain 8000 
Headcount 7320 
Normalised Poverty Gap 7940 
Squared Poverty gap 86000 
Watts measure 8000 
Income Gap (sen) 1800 
Sen measure (with Gini) 1800 
Sen Measure (with Jain) 2000 
FGT 3 1800 
Table 7-2: Coverage constraints violations 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
Most of the poverty measure results were sub‐par, producing worse results than fairness 
and the efficiency measure. However, a simple poverty measure, poverty gap, performed 
relatively well in every instance. The nature of poverty measures, being non‐convex is related 
to the way our algorithm works.  
General conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter is that setting the poverty line 
affects the perceived unhappiness but might not affect the actual results. Simpler measures 
such as poverty gap and up to a point headcount performed better than the more 
complicated ones, and the search function might have had a role on that. 
Generally, poverty alone cannot be used in order to produce efficient results, and might be 
better to use central tendency measures in order to produce poverty‐aversion distributions. 
However, poverty can still be used as a part of an objective function with other goals. 
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Chapter 8 Social Welfare Functions 
8.1 Introduction 
Social welfare function, a term introduced by Bergson (1938) corresponds to a complete 
evaluation of a society. Seminal work from Sen (1973) and Atkinson (1970) set the foundation 
on this work.  
As shown, having perfect fairness does not guarantee good solutions. Fairness is about the 
distribution of resources, not the amount of the resources distributed. The results from 
chapter 6 agree with this Hypothesis. Even though the fairness measures produced fair 
rosters, those rosters are not efficient, and could not be applied in practice. 
For example, in the results discussed in 6.4, even though Atkinson measures performed really 
good in fairness, they all underperformed in every individual compared to even the worst‐
off individual in Average. All nurses’ sum of constraint violations was higher than the sum of 
constraint violations of the nurse that had the most in the allocation produced from Average 
measure. It can be assumed that even with a roster being fairer, a community of nurses 
would not accept a roster that was worse in every individual comparison. 
Kaplow and Shavell (2003) also discussed about fairness not necessary linking to Pareto 
optimality. In fact, there are a lot of cases that fairness is correlated with reducing the 
happiness of the individuals involved (Kaplow and Shavell 1999). They advocate the use of 
Social Welfare Functions (SWF) for decision making. 
In order to address this issue fairness measures were combined with an efficiency measure, 
namely sum or average (Sen 1971, Dagum 1990, Atkinson 1970). Some arguments for 
Welfare instead of fairness can be given in Kaplow and Shavel (2000). 
In SWF the evaluation of a society is made upon a function of utility. The difference between 
SFW and inequality aversion is that inequality only studies the differences between utilities 
of individuals, while SWF also examines the level of individual Utility. 
According to Rawls (1971) an evaluation of an allocation can be written as a function of the 
individual utility in an allocation. 
  =  (  ,  ,…   ) (1) 
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This formula indicates that the welfare   of a society is a function of utilities    of individuals 
in a society. 
According to Sen, welfare is also an expression of total utility and the distribution between 
individuals, such as: 
  =  ( , )(2). where   is welfare,   is the mean utility, and   is the inequality between 
individuals. Multiplying (1) with mean utility and dividing all individual incomes by mean 
utility it would lead us to this expression 
  =   (
  
 
,
  
 
,…
  
 
) (3) 
In case of perfect equality between    the welfare of this distribution would be equal to the 
mean utility. 
And in turn to   =  (1 −  ) (4) 
Where   is an inequality index bounded between 0,1. This inequality index traditionally is 
Gini index. However, there is no reason not to select another bounded inequality measure. 
Since   is limited between 0 and 1, the welfare function considers an allocation to be as good 
as the sum of the individual utilities in case of perfect equality. However, in case of perfect 
equality and low average utility, the welfare of a society would be considered at best 
average, as we can see from chapter 6.3. 
In this research, we expand the definition of 3, and more bounded Fairness measures are 
used instead of just Gini index. Atkinson (1970), Jains (1984) and Theils (1967) measure are 
used.  
8.2 Models 
As in fairness, there are properties that SWF should satisfy. Some of them are identical 
(transfer principle, scare invariance) however the difference is that SWF should target pareto 
optimality.  
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Social Welfare A-fairness SW with Theil SW with Gini SW with Jain 
Transfer principle     
Scale invariance     
Principle of population     
Decomposability     
Pareto     
Boundedness n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Complete ordering     
Landau notation O(n) O(n) O(nlogn) O(n) 
Alg analysis## 10n+3a*n 20n 12  + 8nlog   
− 4 ∗2       
10n 
Table 8-1: Social welfare measures 
Some observations about the properties of the above measures. All of them satisfy the 
transfer principle, scale invariance, principle of population, can provide a complete ordering, 
and strive for pareto optimality. None of them is bounded: the reasoning is that welfare can 
have no upper limit, subject to constraints. Gini is not decomposable, transferring this 
property from Gini measure, that is not always decomposable. The computational cost is the 
same as with fairness properties, since the mean can be calculated in one go, while 
calculating the fairness measures themselves. 
The models used were following. The first five measures were introduced in Martin et al 
(2013). 
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Measure Objective function 
Average 
     =    
   
   
 
MinMax 
      =       +    
   
   
 
Deviation 
      =  |   −  |
   
   
+    
   
   
 
Max difference       = (      −       +  ) ∗  
Sum of Squares 
      =  (  )
 
   
   
 
Gini index     = ∑   
 
    ∗ 
    
 
−
 ∑  ∗  
 
   
 ∑   
 
   
   
Jain index 
   =
∑ (  )
  
   
∑   
 
   
 
Theil's index 
    =
1
  ∗log( )
    ∗log(
  
 
)
   
   
 
Atkinson index 
0.1     = ( (
  
  
)( . )
   
   
)(
 
 . 
)) 
Atkinson index 
0.9999     = ( (
  
 
 
)( .      )
   
   
)(
 
 .      
)) 
Atkinson index 
1.00001     = ( (
  
 
  
)(  .      )
   
   
)(
 
  .      
)) 
Atkinson index 
1.9     = ( (
  
 
 
)(  . )
   
   
)(
 
  . 
)) 
Table 8-2: Social welfare measures 
 
The fairness measures were adjusted in order to be completely fair when then measures are 
1. In order to construct the Social welfare function, they were multiplied by the average. This 
way the measures are maximised in complete fairness, and when the average is maximised. 
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While something relevant has been done with Gini index (eg Atkinson 1970) Jain and Theil 
have not been included in such a way in SWF.  
An objective that someone could raise for those measures is measure 2 and four do not 
evaluate the whole allocation, but rather the outliners. Measures 6 to 8 were adapted from 
fairness measures using (3) to include effectiveness. Measures 9 to 13 are the ones proposed 
by Atkinson (1970). 
8.3 Methodology  
In order to create a roster acceptable by both nurses and hospital some assumptions must 
be made. To begin with, the lengths of hospitals flexibility in wards coverage is a matter of 
discussion. Some employers are willing to make small compromises in order to keep 
employees happy and productive. Another possible way to approach this issue, is the 
negotiating power of the nurses, and the enforcement power of the hospital’s management. 
Both of those approaches imply tradeoffs between two goals. 
The objective function used for those experiments was 
   =    (  ) +       (  ) (1) 
Where    the weight for nurses’ welfare satisfaction,  (  ) the normalised function of 
nurses’ welfare,      the weight for hospitals needs coverage and  (  ) the normalised 
hospital ward coverage. The sum weights of nurse and ward coverage satisfactions equal to 
1. 
    +    = 1 
Different values of    and    were chosen, similar to Jones (2011) (Table 8.3). The lower 
weight (0.05) was selected in order to heavily focus on the nurses’ satisfaction. The higher 
value of ward coverage weight reflects the power of hospitals upon their employers. The 
intermediate values (0.4, 0,6) to show compromises between nurses’ satisfaction and 
hospitals’ needs.  
Coverage (  ) SWF (  ) 
0.05 0.95 
0.4 0.6 
0.6 0.4 
0.95 0.05 
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Table 8-3: Weight Grid 
The values of  (  )and  (  )O Range from a few thousands to a couple of hundred 
thousand. That values are the weighted sum of constraint violations, and the score of 
Hospital satisfaction (coverage constraints) and nurse satisfaction (nurses’ constraints). In 
order to be able to weight coverage and SWF results a normalisation must be performed. 
The reasoning behind this is that if there is no normalisation the values of the measure that 
ranges higher will have a greater impact on the overall objective function (1) over the ones 
that range lower. 
Tests were run to find ideal and anti‐ideal points for both SWF and Coverage. To find the 
ideal points for SWF runs were performed with coverage weights set to 0.9999 and 0.0001. 
The same procedure was followed to find the ideal and anti‐ideal points in coverage. 
Coverage and SWF values were tailored according to the following formulas. 
 (  ) =
    −        
         −        
 
 (  ) =
(    −       )
       −       
 
 (  ) is the value of hospital’s coverage satisfaction.     is the value of the sum of the 
weighted constraint violations for coverage in this particular roster.         is the ideal point 
of coverage constraint violations that was found using weight as 0.9999.          is the anti‐
ideal point of coverage constraint violations obtained by using coverage weight as 0.0001. 
         is larger than         since it Is a minimisation problem. 
Similar procedure was made to normalise nurse’s satisfaction ( (  ).     was the sum of 
weighted constraint violations for this allocation.        is the minimum constraint 
violations for this specific measure, obtained by using nurses satisfaction weight as 0.0001 
and coverage weight as 0.9999.        is the maximum constraint violations for this 
specific measure, obtained by using nurses satisfaction weight as 0.9999 and nurses 
satisfaction weight as 0.0001. 
8.4 Evaluation 
In order to evaluate both fairness and effectiveness, Lorenz and generalised Lorenz curves 
were used, described in chapter 4. However, coverage cannot be included in Lorenz or 
generalised Lorenz curves, since more assumptions are needed on where the coverage 
importance lies.  
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Two different set of results are presented. In the first set different measures are compared 
using the same weights in coverage and nurses’ satisfaction weights. Those comparisons’ 
goals are to examine the relative performance between the measures, and potential 
differences between them when the weights of nurses and coverage change. 
In the second set comparisons between results produced by the 3 SWF functions of the form 
  =  (1 −  ) using different weights. This is to analyse the sensitivity of each measure using 
different weights of coverage and nurse constraint violations. 
8.4.1 Lorenz Curves 
Lorenz curves are again used in order to compare the fairness aspect of the solutions. The 
lines that are closer to equality line are considered to be more equal – the ones that are 
drawn upper. All The results presented are from the first instance. 
 
Figure 8-1: Lorenz Curve CoverWeight 0.05  
When setting the weights of nurse satisfaction to 0.95 and coverage to 0.05, the most equal 
results according to Lorenz curves are the ones produced by Gini index, without crossing with 
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any other line. The second best are the ones produced by Deviation, again without crossing 
with any other line. The next lines are crossing: Atkinson index 0.1, 0.9999, Jain index, 
Atkinson 1.00001, Square sum and MinMax by order of performance in the worst of 
members. Average is the one lower, followed by Max difference and then Theil, without 
those lines being crossed. 
Since the value of weights for nurses’ satisfaction is the highest in this example, results are 
more consistent. For example, someone could expect that average would not perform well 
in fairness. 
 
Figure 8-2: Lorenz Curve CoverWeight 0.4 
Gini index is again the higher curve, without crossing with any other line. The other curves 
are crossing in various points. The only safe outcome that could come out of this example is 
that Gini is producing the fairest results, and the others are incomparable. 
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Figure 8-3: Lorenz Curve CoverWeight 0.6 
 
Gini index again produces the fairest results, being the higher curve without crossing with 
any other curve. The rest of the curves cross. The ones performing worse are Atkinson index 
and Average (even though their lines cross, their lines do not cross with any other line). Since 
the weight of nurses’ satisfaction starts to be lower than hospital satisfaction irregularities 
start to happen. 
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Figure 8-4: Lorenz Curve CoverWeight 0.95 
In the final experiment, where nurses’ satisfaction starts to be negligible compared to 
coverage constraints Gini again provides with the fairest results, followed by Deviation. 
However, the rest of the results become incomparable: At some point average outperforms 
in the aspect of fairness all but four measures. That’s because coverage constraints are so 
much more important than welfare results that the small differences between measures are 
not relevant. 
8.4.2 Generalised Lorenz curves 
Generalised Lorenz curves were used to compare results to compare the “welfare” aspect of 
the measures. The lines that are lower are considered better, since they represent the 
cumulative sum of weighted constraint violations. 
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Figure 8-5: Generalised Lorenz CoverWeight 0.05 
In the first case, where the nurse’s satisfaction is most important most of the results are 
incomparable and their Generalised Lorenz (GL) curves were crossing. The only exception is 
that Gini index is by far the worst, not being crossed by any line. The average outperforms 
all other measures for the majority of cumulative nurses, however is crossing with one 
(square sum). The results from Theil’s index, Sum of squares, and all Atkinson measures are 
crossing, and in the end not far from average. Jain index, max difference, Deviation and min 
max are clearly the worse (excluding Gini). 
Since nurse’s satisfaction is much more significant than ward coverage some conclusions can 
be drawn. Welfare performance is antithetical with fairness. Measures such as average that 
performed bad in fairness are performing good at welfare and vice versa. There are some 
clear groups of performance based on welfare: even though the GL curves are crossing, they 
do not intersect so much as the next cases. 
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Figure 8-6: Generalised Lorenz CoverWeight 0.4 
In this case the results from Theil, average, Sum of squares and Atkinson 1.9 cross and are 
close for the most part. Gini is the only one that can its GL curve do not intersect with any 
other, going higher than any other. Minmax and max difference are the second higher group, 
even though max difference intersect at the first nurses and even outperforms other 
measures (coming 4rth best in the first nurse). 
As the weight for nurses’ happiness star to lower, the results become more inconsistent. 
However Theil, Average, Square sum and Atkinson 1.9 still have high performance as in the 
previous example. 
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Figure 8-7: Generalised Lorenz CoverWeight 0.6 
The results for nurse satisfaction weights set to 0.4 are more intersecting than the ones in 
the previous examples, that is normal since the importance of welfare drops. Gini index still 
is the one that is higher than any other measure at all points. Average crosses with 4 other 
measures (Atkinson index 1.9, Theils index, Square sum and minmax. Square sum crosses 
with Theil, Atkinson 1.9, minmax and Average. Max difference still is the second worse after 
Gini. 
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Figure 8-8 
In the last example, where nurses’ welfare is set to be almost neglectable, all GL curves 
intersect with another. Even Gini index that was clearly the worst in previous examples is 
crossing with Jain index. Average performance is between the 7th and 10th place, contrary 
to the other cases where average was among the best performing measures. It can be 
assumed that no safe conclusions can be drawn about nurses’ welfare. 
8.4.2.1 Case studies 
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of some SWF to weight changes, comparison between the 
results of a SWF with different weights must be made. The GL curves of three selected 
measures are presented. It would be expected that for higher weights on nurse satisfaction 
the better (lower) the GL curves would be since minimizing constraint violations of nurses 
(and thus pointing the GL curve lower) would be more important.  
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Figure 8-9: Case study Jain 
Jain curves are the only completely consistent with our hypothesis. The higher the weight for 
nurses’ satisfaction, the lower the curve. The curves do not intersect either. 
 
Figure 8-10: Case study Gini 
Gini displays an opposite behavior: even though all curves are close and higher than the ones 
in the other studies (Jain and Theil) the order of results is 0.95 > 0.6> 0.4 >0.05. 
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.  
Figure 8-11: Case study Theil 
Theil’s index behaviour is somewhere in the middle. While case 0.05 is the best followed by 
0.40, the two last ones cross.  
From the above tables, the obvious remark that can be made is that Jain is the measure that 
is more sensitive to changes, Gini index seem to be the measure that is least sensitive, and 
Theil is somewhere in the middle. Jains results are the ones closer to expectations, following 
by Theil and Gini results are irrational. 
8.4.3 ELECTRE 
The results were evaluated by ELECTRE method (Roy 1991). The results from the different 
measures are the alternatives, while individual constraint violations are defined as criteria. 
Criteria are sorted, since the ones with more constraint violations are more important than 
the ones with less constraint violations. The weights for each criterion is given by this 
formula: 
    =
(  −    + 1)
 
∑ (  −   + 1)     
 
The value we chose for z equals to one. This ensures our goal for fairness, while still leaving 
space for efficiency. 
Non‐comparable (veto) conditions were set as well. Two solutions were deemed as non‐
comparable when both the following cases were true: 
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In any individual in the bottom 12.5% of the ranked table solution A was way worse than 
solution B. “Way worse” was defined as having more than triple constraint violation than its 
counterpart. 
The total quality in solution A was found to be better than Solution B. 
We state that there is a concordance threshold as a percentage of the weights that are in 
favour of one distribution against another. If while comparing distributions no single 
distribution exceeds the concordance threshold, we consider them to be indifferent towards 
each other. If one distribution exceeds the threshold, we can conclude that this distribution 
is better. We experimented with different concordance thresholds in those 3 cases. 
Apart from nurse roster quality, other aspects of the results should be examined. Coverage 
results are of importance for a schedule to be accepted by the wards. In order to compare 
the measures, total running times and average running time for each iteration should be 
considered. To accommodate that, coverage constraints were incorporated into ELECTRE 
method. The results presented in the next table are from first instance with social welfare 
value weight set at 0.4, coverage weight at 0.6 (the graphs 8.2, 8.6 from chapter 8.4).  
In order to incorporate the coverage satisfaction into the evaluation coverage constraint 
violations were given 50% of the total weight. The other 50% was assigned to nurses 
according to the formula above (also described in 4.4.1) 
 
Measur
es 
Average MinMa
x 
Deviati
on 
Max 
diff 
Square 
sum 
Jain Gini Theil's Atk 0.1 Atk 
0.9999 
Atk 
1.0001 
Atk 1.9 
Average X 0.00 0.10 0.50 Incomp 0.10 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.60 0.11 
MinMa
x 
1.00 X 0.47 0.79 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
Deviati
on 
0.90 0.53 X Incomp 1.00 0.89 0.50 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.92 
Max 
diff 
0.50 0.21 Incomp X 0.50 0.47 0.11 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.50 
Square 
sum 
Incomp 0.50 0.00 0.50 X 0.50 0.50 0.07 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.57 
Jain 0.90 0.50 0.11 0.53 0.50 X 0.00 0.48 0.79 0.92 0.93 0.45 
Gini  1.00 1.00 0.50 0.89 0.50 1.00 X 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Theil's  0.83 0.50 0.05 0.50 0.93 0.52 0.50 X 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 
Atk 0.1 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.53 0.50 0.21 0.00 0.48 X 0.39 0.87 0.45 
Atk 
0.9999 
0.90 0.00 0.10 0.53 0.50 0.08 0.00 0.50 0.61 X 0.60 0.48 
Atk 
1.00001 
0.40 0.00 0.10 0.53 0.50 0.07 0.00 0.48 0.14 0.40 X 0.47 
Atk 1.9 0.89 0.50 0.08 0.50 0.43 0.55 0.00 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.53 X 
Table 8-4: ELECTRE method 
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The threshold for concordance test was set to be 0.75. Selecting the threshold this high 
ensures that one alternative has both coverage constraints (50% of weights) and at least half 
of the nurses’ criteria weights (25% of total weights) to support the dominance.  
Some observations about the above table. Average, Max diff, Square sum, and Atk1.0001 
were not dominated by any other alternative. In the case of MaxDiff, this is largely because 
of good performance in Coverage constraint violations. Average outperformed most other 
measures, with the exception of Atk 1.0001. 
 
8.4.4 Computational cost 
In order to have a clearer view in the quality of the results produced, the amount of times an 
algorithm has been run and the speed of this algorithm is important. If two results are 
comparable in roster quality, but one is lacking in speed per iteration or total number of 
iterations, then this one can be considered.  
The computational cost for each algorithm run included not only the calculation of the 
measure, but other factors as well. Apart from the normalisation, calculating the constraint 
violations, simulated annealing moves and coverage constraint violations were calculated 
each time an algorithm run was performed. Those calculations took the majority of time 
that’s why as in chapter 6 the running time does not agree with the algorithmic analysis given 
in chapter 4. 
The number of runs was similar in any measure, minimising the importance of the iteration 
factor, and leading us to safer conclusions. 
 
Objective function Time required for each run 
Average 0.434825928 
MinMax 0.861559748 
Deviation 0.231503282 
Max difference 12.2681077 
Sum of Squares 0.41738748 
Jain index 0.394580085 
Gini index 0.454176934 
Theil's index 0.465473573 
Atkinson index 0.1 0.390843229 
Atkinson index 0.9999 0.42947806 
Atkinson index 1.00001 0.424199308 
Atkinson index 1.9 0.392506182 
Table 8-5: Computational cost 
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8.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter it is introduced a novel approach to Social welfare in nurse rostering, 
introducing new measures used in the SWF concept. The measures are applied using existing 
search methods in popular Nurse rostering benchmarks. The results were encouraging; New 
measures performed satisfactorily, in many instances. Depending on the instance, Jain index, 
cases of Atkinson and Theil index shone between them. 
Those outranking methods provide a framework for evaluating distributions with respect in 
fairness. Being flexible and easily adjustable can emulate personal views from any type of 
decision maker, more or less inequality averse, or efficient hungry. Thus, it can be stated that 
this framework can be applied in most problems where the aspect of fairness and efficiency 
could be present. 
Next steps include applying this framework and measures to other OR problems. An 
interesting direction would be to implement other similar concepts to fairness in nurse 
rostering, such as poverty‐starvation of resources. 
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Chapter 9 Goal programming 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 presented the results on fairness, that showed that when used as an exclusive goal 
the outcome is not applicable. Poverty results were interesting, and applicable by 
themselves, but some of the times high inequality results. A way to combine both poverty, 
fairness, efficiency and the necessary satisfaction of coverage constraints would be Goal 
programming (Jones 2011), described in 4.5. 
9.2 Methodology  
Goal programming can be used in order to combine different goals. In nurse rostering, the 
equivalent of a goal is the satisfaction of an individual nurse. The benchmarks used in this 
thesis have minimum of 19 nurses, creating a system with at least 19 different goals. This 
would not be practical, and meta goals were instead investigated. A meta goal is defined as 
a property of the system that is not a specific goal, but rather a side effect from the actual 
goal. 
In this case, satisfying the “efficiency” goal would imply that the average nurse constraint 
violation is below a point, while satisfying a goal would imply that a specific nurse’ sum of 
constraint violations is below a point. 
The four meta goals were defined as follows: 
 Efficiency: The sum of the sum of Nurses constraint violations 
 Poverty was defined as the headcount ratio, the percentage of nurses that their sum 
of constraint violations was below a threshold 
 Coverage was defined as the sum of hospitals needs’ constraint violations 
 For fairness models the measures in Chapter 6 were used. 
In order to be able to compare goals in a similar order of magnitude, the above criteria were 
normalised. Headcount ration did not need to be normalised since it ranges between 0 (when 
no one is considered poor) and 1 (when everyone is above poverty line). As fairness goals, 
normalised fairness measures were used for simplicity. Those measures are Jains, Gini, Theils 
and variations of Atkinson measures. However, some steps for the normalisation of the other 
meta goals were needed. 
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A series of tests were performed in order to find a reasonable array of values for both 
coverage and efficiency constraints for each instance. The first set of experiments was 
performed with having only efficiency and only coverage as goals. Thus, we established the 
absolute best efficiency and worst coverage, and worst efficiency and best coverage 
respectively. The second set of experiments was run with their respective weights being 
0.001 and 0.999, defining a lower limit of best and worst values. 
9.3 Models 
In order to evaluate the quality of nurse rosters produced by goal programming models’ 
experiments were applied are again on benchmarks from Bilgin 2008. Those benchmarks 
provided 4 different wards with 2 different scenarios: emergency, geriatrics, psychiatry and 
reception wards, with nurses having identical or different preferences. The wards vary in 
parameters such as number of nurses needed, scheduling period, number of shifts and skills 
categorisation. The total number of constrains differ in each ward, with geriatrics ward being 
the most trivial and Emegerncy being the most complicated one. In the cases of scenarios 
with nurses having variable preferences, the constraints are personalised, but there still is a 
contract that is common for a set of nurses. To avoid presenting an unnecessary number of 
results, the results from the personalised and identical preferences were combined. 
The weights between the 4 different meta‐objectives on our GP model were set on the 
following way: 
 
Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight 
Coverage 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.25 
Efficiency 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.25 
Fairness 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.25 
Poverty 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.25 
Table 9-1: Weight grid 
Those weights were selected in order to better represent the views of different decision 
makers. The higher the weight in each goal is, the more important this goal is to the decision 
maker. In the first four cases, the decision maker showed strong preference over one 
criterion. The next four showed a more balanced approach to the four meta‐goals, while still 
having one preference over the others. The last set of weights is completely balanced, 
signifying complete preference equality between the four goals. The weights are resembling 
the ones from Jones 2011 method. 
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As seen, in the majority of situations the collective goals for nurse happiness was weighted 
more than wards’ needs. 
Since poverty, efficiency and fairness goals all address to the issue of nurse satisfaction, 
another way to view this problem is to those 3 goals can be combined into one goals: nurse 
satisfaction. That would be another presentation of the same problem, merging the 3 meta‐
goals into one. The number of experiments performed for each case of total weight assigned 
to coverage and nurses’ satisfaction is given in the next table 9.2. 
 
Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight 
Coverage 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.25 
Nurse satisfaction 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.75 
Experiments 1 case 3 cases 1 case 3 cases 1 case 
Table 9-2: Aggregated weight grid 
The weighted goal program was modeled as follows: 
           =      ∗   +      ∗   +       ∗   +      ∗   
 .  :
    −        
         −        
 −    = 0 
    −        
         −    _    
−    = 0 
     −    = 0 
    −    = 0 
    ,    ,     ,     are the respective weights for the goals, and     are the positive 
deviational variables. Since the optimal values for normalised efficiency, coverage, fairness 
and poverty meta goals are 0, any positive deviation is penalised. The objective function of 
the goal programming model is to minimise those deviations. 
The Chebyshev formulation has the same constraints: 
         = max (  ,  ,     ) 
 .  :
    −        
         −        
 −    = 0 
    −        
         −    _    
−    = 0 
     −    = 0 
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    −    = 0 
The objective function of the Chebyshev formulation is to minimise the maximum deviation 
from the meta‐goals. 
“Fair” is defined by the model used, be it either Jain, Gini, Theil or Atkinson. 
9.4 Results 
Since the number of possible combinations between models, instances and weights is a large 
one, the results between problems with identical and different preferences were combined. 
So, the presented results are on four benchmarks instead of 8. This is made in order to have 
a clearer presentation of the results. 
The results are going to be presented in two ways. Firstly, results for one particular instance 
and for particular measure, in order to explore the differences between results from 
different weights. Secondly, results for one instance, and a particular view of the central 
decision maker weights will be presented, with the results from all measures. This way the 
measures will be compared by weight value. 
9.5 Evaluation 
Evaluating the results of an allocation is a problem by itself. the models are based on 
individual happiness as well as goal satisfaction, so a cardinal evaluation is really hard. Using 
cardinal measures such as Jain in Martin 2013 is not an option, since those measures are 
either already used, or could have been used in the formulation. Thus, an evaluation based 
on individual happiness is required to evaluate the results. Generalised Lorenz Curves, 
satisfaction levels and a form of “fair ELECTRE” were applied. 
Generalised Lorenz curves are preferred in this case since they represent both the 
distribution and the utility that is distributed. 
In order to present the results in a clearer way an analysis of the measure is performed.   A 
selection of the best measure is made in order to enable a comparison against each measure.   
Satisfaction levels 
Another way to view evaluate results is by satisfaction level tables. In those tables the 
normalised performance of each criterion is shown. Poverty and fairness are always within 
the limits of zero and one, however in cases where coverage and efficiency weights are low, 
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these criteria might be out of those limits. This can be explained by the levels of ideal and 
anti‐ideal values selected. 
The antithesis between covering hospitals’ needs and satisfying nurses is clear. In the cases 
where efficiency was the most important factor coverage criterion was more than twice the 
allowed max. That can be explained of the direct opposition between those two: having low 
nurses’ satisfaction constraint violations is antithetical to having low hospitals constraint 
violations. The antithesis between fairness and efficiency is apparent when fairness is 
weighted really high: having a fair roster do not equal to having an efficient one. This agrees 
with the results from chapter 8. Efficiency and starvation of resources seem to have a 
synergy: when weight in poverty criterion is high, efficiency criterion has a low value as well. 
This makes sense, since the goal of poverty criterion is to push individuals lower than a point, 
while the goal of efficiency is to push individuals as low as possible. 
Another interesting viewpoint is the differences in trade‐offs different fairness measures 
bring. Atkinson and Gini index are quite “strong”, and that leads to a complete contrast with 
efficiency: in most cases where fairness is weighted 0.7 and Gini and Atkinson measures are 
examined, efficiency is more than the least desired threshold. The lower achievements in 
efficiency usually lead to worse results in poverty as well. In every case where Fairness was 
more important than other measures weighting either 70% or 40% of total weights, poverty 
and efficiency were underperforming. 
 
9.5.1 Lorenz curves 
Lorenz curves were formulated using only the individual happiness results, and excluding the 
coverage results. The reason behind that is the way lays in the Lorenz curves formulation: it 
is included individual happiness and excluded the overage score, since it would need more 
assumptions on how coverage score is compared with individuals. For example, in cases 
where coverage constrains had a bigger score than the worst individual coverage should be 
the first observation. However, if coverage is smaller than the best individual it should be in 
the last part of the curve. A compromise could be that the coverage should always be the 
first observation of the curve making it always more important than any individual, or last 
making it always the least important. This would go beyond the point of weighting the trade‐
offs between different goals. 
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The curves presented here are from the combined problems 1 (Emergency) and 4 
(Geriatrics). Emergency instance have the largest number of nurses (27), and geriatrics have 
19 (smallest along with reception, but with less number of shift types. It is worth noting that 
both Reception and Psychiatry (aggregated instances 2 and 3) display very similar behaviour 
with Emergency in all measures. 
Problem1: 
 
Figures 9-1 Atkinson Lorenz curve, aggregated problem 1 
The GL curve for GP with Atkinson measure shows that the best (lower) curve is the one 
produced by assigning high weights in efficiency (0.7 efficiency weight). The worst results are 
the ones produced by minmax. The rest of the curves are crossing, with the curve for fairness 
0.7 being second lowest in the first nurses and second highest in the last ones. This is to be 
explained since fairness generally gives greater priority to the first nurses, the ones that have 
most constraint violations. The results produced by fairness 0.4 start being 4th lowest, to 
2nd lowest to 6th lowest. That is a more balanced approach of the fairness 0.7, that do not 
perform as good at the nurses with lower constraint violations or raise as high in the nurses 
with the most constraint violations. 
 
The first results presented are from Atkinson measure.  
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Figure 9-2: Atkinson Lorenz curve, aggregated problem 4 
The results in instance 4 (Geriatrics) are quite different than the other instances. The results 
produced by high coverage (coverage 0.7) are the lowest at all points. Minmax provide the 
3rd‐4th best results. High efficiency starts as the second‐best curve for the nurse with most 
constraint violations and ends up being the highest. It is also worth noting that most curves 
cross. 
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Figure 9-1: Gini Lorenz curve, aggregated problem 1 
Results from Gini are somewhat following the pattern from the results produced by Atkinson. 
The Lorenz curve produced by high efficiency (efficiency 0.7) is the lowest without crossing 
with any other curve. The curve produced by high poverty (poverty 0.7) are second lowest 
till cumulative nurse number 21, only then outperformed by second high efficiency 
(efficiency 0.4) that in turn underperformed (with a high curve) in the first nurses. Results 
produced by high fairness and minmax were the ones with the highest curves, outperformed 
by any other measure. 
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Figure 9-2 Gini Lorenz curve, aggregated problem 4 
As in Atkinson, the best result produced was by the high coverage (coverage 0.7). The results 
produced by the second highest coverage (coverage 0.4) performed were second lowest in 
the start and the end of the curve, while dropping up to the 6th place at around the middle 
of the curve. Minmax also ranged between 3rd and 5th. Apart from the first nurse, the curve 
of high efficiency (efficiency 0.7) was outperformed by all other results, being higher than 
the rest. 
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Figure 9-3: Jain Lorenz curve, aggregated problem 1 
As in the previous graphs, high efficiency (efficiency 0.7) curve was the lowest at all points. 
High fairness (fairness 0.7) was the second lowest at the first nurses, and ranged between 
2nd and 4th best. Balanced results (0.25) ranged between 3rd and 4th best. Somewhat 
balanced fairness focused (fairness 0.4) started well as the 4th lowest curve, dropping to 7th 
lowest and then being the second lowest curve in the nurses 18‐27. Minmax again was 
thehighest curve, without crossing with any other. 
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Figure 9-4: Jain Lorenz curve, aggregated problem 4 
High coverage (coverage 0.7) curve was the lowest, without crossing with any other curve. 
Balanced weights (0.25) was the highest at all points without crossing with any other curve. 
High efficiency (0.7) started as a normal performing curve (4th ‐5th) but from cumulative 
nurse number 4 was the second lowest curve, remaining that way till the end. Minmax 
performed well early (2nd) but declined at the later nurses (8th). High fairness did not 
achieve something better than the 5th lower curve. Somewhat balanced efficiency ranged 
from 3rd to 4th lower curve. 
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Figure 9-5: Theil’s Lorenz curve, aggregated problem 1 
Unsurprisingly, High efficiency curve was the lowest at all points. Relatively high weight 
efficiency ranged from 2nd best to 4th best. High poverty performed bad at the first nurses, 
and improved being 3rd best. Minmax was at the last at almost all points.   
 
Figure 9-6: Theil Lorenz curve, aggregated problem 4 
Finally, in the combined geriatrics instance, high coverage was the lowest curve. High 
efficiency performed well in the first nurses but dropped to be the 8th best. Moderately high 
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poverty performed bad at the worst‐off nurses, but at the latest points of the curve was the 
3rd lower. Moderately high efficiency and high fairness started relatively well but ended up 
being among the highest curves. 
The results in Lorenz curves are mixed. In the majority of the problems, the best result is 
when efficiency criterion is weighted highly. In the aggregated 4th instance the dominating 
results are the ones from the coverage criterion. It would be expected to have models that 
weight efficiency highly performing well. It would make sense in a way that those cases are 
trying to improve all individuals, something that is easily illustrated in Lorenz curves. 
Measures with high weights in fairness would be expected to perform better in the first part 
of the curve, where the most worse‐off nurses are shown, and less well in the latter part of 
the curve. This is the case in three out of four of those combined instances. 
Some possible explanations could be that the ideal and anti‐ideal points set were not 
representative of the instances. Selecting ideal and anti‐ideal points affects the performance 
of the objective functions. For example, if an anti‐ideal point is set too low, some objective 
function might appear to perform well in that meta goal. If an ideal point is set too high, an 
objective function might appear to perform bad in this meta goal. 
Another reason for the difference of the performance on different weights of the meta goals 
could be that the difference between constraint violations for nurses in instances. Having a 
different number of constraint violations might affect the difference between ideal and anti‐
ideal points and consequently the meta‐goals performance. 
The difference between the number of nurses might also influence meta goals. For example, 
having a smaller number of individuals might make a fairness measure much more sensitive 
in changes. 
9.5.2 Satisfaction Levels 
The satisfaction levels of the four novel measures are presented. Since all meta‐goals are 
either bounded (fairness, poverty) or normalised (efficiency, coverage) it would be natural 
to view the performance of each objective function. The purpose of satisfaction levels is to 
show the performance of each objective function for each meta goal, ranged between 0 and 
1. Values close to zero would represent the achievement of near ideal point values for this 
particular meta goal. In the table with weighted formulation, there are some objective 
functions with values that surpass 1 in some meta goals. While in the result generation this 
value would be equal to 1, in the following table numbers larger than 1 represent 
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performance worse than the anti‐ideal point at this particular meta‐goal. This happened 
because even after experiments to identify ideal and anti‐ideal points, some objective 
functions valued some meta‐goals  low, in a way that allowed for worse performance than 
anti‐ideal points. 
Table 9.3 presents the satisfaction of the minmax formulation.  
Problem0 Coverage Efficiency Fairness Poverty 
Jain 0.69426 0.050979 0.685185 0.694293 
Gini 0.663847 0.322581 0.666667 0.649758 
Theil 0.795126 0.034593 0.796296 0.790912 
Atkinson 0.724305 0.519183 0.703704 0.721467 
 
Problem2 
Coverage Efficiency Fairness Poverty 
Jain 0.863809 0.067896 0.857143 0.802885 
Gini 0.85453 0.302985 0.857143 0.826923 
Theil 0.850048 0.071551 0.833333 0.658654 
Atkinson 0.903524 0.45672 0.904762 0.903846 
 
Problem4 
Coverage Efficiency Fairness Poverty 
Jain 0.877759 0.070264 0.736842 0.879808 
Gini 0.830985 0.298981 0.736842 0.807692 
Theil 0.861403 0.058491 0.763158 0.783654 
Atkinson 0.802353 0.593829 0.763158 0.759615 
 
Problem6 
Coverage Efficiency Fairness Poverty 
Jain 0.915753 0.080238 0.868421 0.893275 
Gini 0.945562 0.422339 0.868421 0.947368 
Theil 0.972959 0.091077 0.894737 0.973684 
Atkinson 0.940917 0.753081 0.921053 0.945906 
Table 9-3: Satisfaction levels for all instances: min max formulation 
 
In the min max formulation, Atkinson and in a lesser extend Gini have the most balanced 
results, with relative smaller differences between the performance for the different meta 
goals. Efficiency is generally not that important when trying to minimise the maximum meta 
goal since the criteria that have high values are coverage, fairness and poverty. 
Table 9.4 presents the results from the weighted formulation for instance 3 (combined 
reception instances).  
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Cov Eff Fair Pov   
 
Cov Eff Fair Pov   
 
0.1 1 0.2 0.8 7/1/1/1 Atk 0 0.9 0.1 0.7 7/1/1/1 Jain 
3.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 1/7/1/1   3.8 0 0.1 0.2 1/7/1/1   
0.1 1.2 0 1 1/1/7/1   0.2 0.9 0.1 0.8 1/1/7/1   
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 1/1/1/7   0.1 0.9 0.1 0.7 1/1/1/7   
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 4/2/2/2   0.1 0.9 0.1 0.8 4/2/2/2   
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.8 2/4/2/2   0.2 0.9 0.1 0.7 2/4/2/2   
0.1 1 0.1 0.8 2/2/4/2   0.2 0.9 0.1 0.7 2/2/4/2   
0.1 1 0.1 0.9 2/2/2/4   0.1 0.9 0.1 0.8 2/2/2/4   
0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 2.5   0.1 0.9 0.1 0.7 2.5   
0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 minmax   0.9 0.1 0.7 0.9 minmax   
Cov Eff Fair Pov     x Eff Fair Pov   
 
0.1 1 0.1 0.8 7/1/1/1 Gini 0 0.9 0.1 0.7 7/1/1/1 Theil 
3.6 0 0.2 0.2 1/7/1/1   3.8 0 0.1 0.2 1/7/1/1   
0.1 1.6 0 1 1/1/7/1   0.2 0.9 0.1 0.8 1/1/7/1   
0.1 1 0.2 0.8 1/1/1/7   0.1 0.9 0.1 0.7 1/1/1/7   
0.1 1 0.1 0.8 4/2/2/2   0.1 0.9 0.1 0.8 4/2/2/2   
0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 2/4/2/2   0.2 0.9 0.1 0.7 2/4/2/2   
0.2 1.1 0.1 0.8 2/2/4/2   0.2 0.9 0.1 0.7 2/2/4/2   
0.1 1 0.2 0.8 2/2/2/4   0.1 0.9 0.1 0.8 2/2/2/4   
0.1 1 0.1 0.9 2.5   0.1 0.9 0.1 0.7 2.5   
0.8 0.3 0.7 0.8 minmax   0.9 0.1 0.7 0.9 minmax   
Table 9-4: Satisfaction levels for problem 4 
Generally, performance of the different objective functions for fairness is good with the 
exception of minmax, where fairness is relatively higher than the rest of the weights. Values 
over 1 appear in coverage performance, and in a lesser extend in efficiency. Poverty and 
fairness are already bounded meta‐goals. Poverty meta‐goal responds good to higher 
weights for efficiency. The explanation between poverty efficiency possible correlation is 
that while poverty “pushes” for a lower point, the goal of efficiency is to push as low as 
possible. Efficiency and coverage are completely antithetical, with the worst performance 
for coverage coming when efficiency weight is set high and vice versa. 
9.5.3 ELECTRE 
As it can be noted, the best results between models are incomparable. In order to compare 
the results between different measures “fair” ELECTRE was applied. The weights were 
selected in an effort to compromise between ward needs and nurse's needs. The weight of 
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the coverage constrain violation was set to be 50%, and the weight for each individual was 
given by this function: 
   =
(  −    + 1)
 
∑ (  −    + 1)
  
 
 
The results of the ELECTRE show a slight preference to the measures that resulted in lower 
coverage constraint violation. This can be subject to change, depending on the weights given 
to the different criteria. The threshold for concordance was set to be 0.7 in order to make 
sure that dominance is not given to an objective function without this objective function 
being better than another at the coverage meta goal, and at least 40% of the weights of 
nurses. 
 
 
 
 
A preference for Theil's measure against Atkinson's measure is the only definite result in the 
first instance. 
 
 
 
 
 
A preference of Gini and Jain over Theil, and Gini over Atkinson was shown in the second 
instance. 
 
 
 
 
A preference of Theil over Atkinson was shown in the third instance 
Atk Gini Jain Theil
Atk X 0.50 0.50 0.77
Gini 0.50 X 0.49 0.69
Jain 0.50 0.51 X 0.50
Theil 0.23 0.31 0.50 X
Atk Gini Jain Theil
Atk X 0.91 0.48 0.39
Gini 0.09 X 0.50 0.20
Jain 0.52 0.50 X 0.00
Theil 0.61 0.80 1.00 X
Atk Gini Jain Theil
Atk X 0.50 0.50 0.84
Gini 0.50 X 0.44 0.59
Jain 0.50 0.56 X 0.50
Theil 0.16 0.41 0.50 X
Table 9-5: ELECTRE aggregated problem 0 
Table 9-6: ELECTRE aggregated problem 2 
Table 9-7: ELECTRE aggregated problem 4 
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Theil and Gini had the same Coverage constraints, so they Were equally good. Atkinson was 
preferred to Theil in the fourth instance. 
Generally, the objective functions that perform well in nurses’ satisfaction (see table 9.2) 
underperform in coverage satisfaction. A lot of pairwise comparisons are close to the 0.5 
point because of the above. Clear evidence of the dominance of one solution over the other 
would require dominance on coverage constraint, and usually on the worse of nurses. In this 
aspect, and because of the negative correlation between efficiency and coverage (see 9.5.2) 
it is sometimes possible for objective functions that underperform in efficiency to show 
dominance over objective functions that do not. Selecting different weight for coverage and 
nurses satisfaction, or even changing the formula that the weight for nurse satisfaction is 
given would see differences in the ELECTRE comparisons. 
9.6 Conclusions 
In this dissertation a novel approach to evaluating societal problems has been introduced. A 
Goal program including new meta‐goals was introduced. Different ways of evaluating results 
on a cardinal basis, using ELECTRE and graphical methods were applied in a large set of 
results.  
Trade‐offs and dependencies between four different goals in a specific problem were hinted. 
Relative strength of different fairness measures towards different goals was tested.  
Atk Gini Jain Theil
Atk X 0.3038277512 0.4043062201 0.2631578947
Gini 0.6961722488 X 0.4282296651 0.7511961722
Jain 0.5956937799 0.5717703349 X 0.6052631579
Theil 0.7368421053 0.7488038278 0.3947368421 X
Table 9-8: ELECTRE aggregated problem 6 
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Chapter 10 conclusions 
The main goal of this thesis is to create the framework and prove the viability of fairness 
related solutions in operational research (OR) problems . The need for those goals stems 
from the lack of an established framework for inequality averse solutions in the context of 
decision making, and the limited application of fairness objective functions in OR problems 
(Chapter 3). 
Chapter 5 discusses the properties and concepts of poverty, or minimisation of unhappiness. 
This is an area of economics that is neglected in the science of decision making. To the 
writer’s knowledge, it is the first time that poverty – as a concept taken from economics‐ is 
applied in an operational research problem. This chapter tries to introduced poverty in 
operational research and establish a framework about poverty. Insight for use of poverty in 
goal programming is provided, and the possible connection between GP and poverty. The 
goal of this chapter is to show that poverty measurement can be used as an objective in OR 
problems. 
Fairness models are tested in chapter 6. Experiments are made using models presented in 
previous chapters. The results show that even though the fairness model produce equal 
rosters the rosters are so ineffective that would not be preferred by most of the individuals 
involved. Comparing rosters for each individual nurse shows that having fair rosters does not 
mean they are also effective. This proves the claims of Kaplow and Shavel (2003) and 
suggests that in order for fairness to be used, it must be part of a series of goals, or part of 
the objective function instead. 
Poverty and minimisation of dissatisfaction is examined in chapter 7. Poverty measurement 
and identification is discussed. Results show that like fairness, poverty averse rosters are not 
necessarily effective. Non‐poverty measures such as Jain and Average seem to do more to 
alleviate poverty than some poverty measures. Also from the experiments it was shown that 
the importance of choosing the appropriate poverty line is of some importance: defining the 
poverty affects the perceived happiness or unhappiness. However, aside the perceived 
happiness for nurses, poverty alone did not produce good results in terms of effectiveness 
or improving the status of the less “privileged” nurses. However, some simpler measures like 
poverty gap did achieve decent results in the aspect of targeting the poverty line, leaving 
room for improvement in future experiments.  
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In chapter 8 the Social Welfare Function (SWF) was introduced. SWF combined the concepts 
of fairness and efficiency in one objective function. In experiments the results are improved 
in fairness (compared to efficiency only measures) and in regards to efficiency (compared to 
fairness only measures). A weight sensitivity analysis was also performed, showing tradeoffs 
between nurse happiness and hospital needs. 
Goal programming model was used in Chapter 9. Objectives from previous chapters, namely 
chapter 6 and 7 were combined with efficiency measure and coverage constraints. This 
created a powerful tool that allows flexibility in decision making. The results show that, 
depending on the preferences, good results can be obtained on all desired criteria. 
To summarise, the thesis contributions were 
 An introduction of fairness models, and a Framework for fairness in OR. 
 An introduction of poverty, poverty models and a framework for poverty in OR. 
 Proof of concept that poverty and fairness can be used, with certain limitations, in 
decision making. 
 Proof of concept that poverty and fairness are viable goals in a set of Goal 
programming and lead to interesting results. 
 Social welfare functions are leading to exceptional results. 
 
10.1 Future directions 
Fairness and poverty in OR is an interesting topic with vast potential applications. The work 
in this thesis focused in a particular problem of operational research (nurse rostering), in 
order to analyse fairness, poverty, SWF, and a goal programming formulation comprising of 
fairness and poverty. However, this can be expanded to other OR problems that involve 
individuals and distributable resources. Other methodologies could be included as well. 
Some possible applications would be the following: 
 Apply poverty and fairness in different areas of OR, such as facility location problem. 
 Adjust search function, or even poverty measures to be more compatible 
 Include more/different poverty/fairness goals in the goal programming model 
formulation. 
 Investigate the feasibility of those methods in problems with a larger number of 
individual entities 
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 Expand Goal Programming using poverty concepts, for example see Jones 2017. 
Finally, an interesting direction for future research would be to view the implications of 
applying fairness, SWF, Poverty or a combination of those objectives in a real‐world 
application, such as an established economy. The effects of interactions between inequality 
or poverty aversion and effectiveness, as defined by Gross domestic products would be of 
importance. An interesting application of could be Greece: a country where less resources 
are distributed every passing day, and with a raising inequality and poverty indexes. The 
question in hand is: can we use fairness, poverty or a combination of those measures in order 
to decide what allocation of resources is the best – and thus enforce reforms that would 
benefit the weaker people of a country in crisis? 
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